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DICKINSON, EDWARD G. Hermeneutic Experience and Intersub­
jectivity in Schools: On the Way Toward Meaning. (1981) 
Directed by: Dr. David E. Purpel. Pp. 149 
This study reflects the ontological significance of re­
search itself. As a linguistic expression of the researcher's 
participation in an ongoing search for a greater understanding 
of intersubjectivity in schools, the study affirms the con­
ditioned nature of being-ness that affects all efforts to in­
terpret human experience. 
Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is the 
model of interpretive theory used in the study. This model 
represents a speculative ontology that is open to the pre-
understandings or prejudices of the interpreter/researcher 
who is pursuing an understanding of a text, an "other," or 
any subject matter. The researcher's self-reflective search 
for the underlying prejudgments that influence the research 
is a significant characteristic of the study. The openness 
of the study informs the possibility of finding meaning that 
is conditioned by the interpreter's historical experience and 
linguistic relationships. 
In offering a hermeneutic dimension of research which 
encourages dialogue as a method for gaining understanding, 
this study attempts to distinguish the traditional conceptu­
alizations of research methodology from what is demonstrated 
as an application of a hermeneutic-dialogical lens of research. 
Selected theoretical reconceptualizations of educational 
experience are discussed in order to point out progress toward 
an interpretive understanding of interpersonal relationships 
in schools. The dependency of these theories on strictly 
epistemological and/or phenomenological descriptions of human 
relationships is critiqued. The failure of these theories to 
acknowledge the universalizable groundworks of the hermeneutic 
experience is credited to their relationship with Habermas's 
critical theory. 
The Habermas-Gadamer debate is explicated in order to 
further clarify the distinction between the objectivistic 
tendencies in the critical perspective concerning conscious 
self-reflection and the intersubjective characteristics of 
the reflective turn in the hermeneutic circle of understanding. 
The later work of Habermas relating to the language phe­
nomenon is discussed in an effort to illustrate that the 
critical tradition is perhaps beginning to converge with the 
interests in philosophical hermeneutics concerning the uni­
versality of the human condition in linguisticality. Con­
tinued differences related to the historical rootedness of 
the self and the question of the legitimacy of (traditional) 
authority are pointed out as barriers separating Habermas's 
sociological interests from the hermeneutic significance to 
all the disciplines. 
The characteristics of hermeneutic-dialectical experience 
are explained as a means to construct an approach for illus­
trating an application of the philosophical hermeneutic lens 
of interpretation to intersubjective relationships in the 
school context. Such hermeneutic characteristics that are 
particularly relevant to experience in schools are openness 
to the questions of all participants in and with the curricu­
lum, the give-and-take of questioning in dialogue, the re-
flexivity experienced by dialogue partners, the transubjective 
mediation that takes place in dialogue, and the conditioning 
affects of language, tradition and history upon our inter-
subjective experience. 
In that the hermeneutic circle is represented in this study 
as not simply a heuristic, methodological device used by the 
researcher, but the reality of being of the researcher and 
researched, the conclusions of the study reflect the media­
tion of the researcher with the researched, in this case the 
illustrative investigation of a classroom dialogue. A better 
understanding of the authoritarian role of the teacher is 
discussed as a result of the researcher's role of participant-
hermeneuticist in this case study. Insofar as the study as 
a whole reflects a journey toward greater understanding of 
the meaning of intersubjectivity (in schools), the disclosure 
of such an understanding is discussed as a distinction between 
the researcher's understanding of how he values this or that 
in experience and how he understands experience itself from 
his study of the hermeneutic endeavor. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study originated with my personal 
desire to construct some common groundworks from which to bet­
ter understand and talk about my role or function as a teacher 
in the traditional educational environment and my interests in 
defining the mundane, yet universal experience of human inter-
subjectivity that represents our ability to relate meaningfully. 
I initiated this search with a rather naive sense of certainty 
that I could draw upon my studies of religious experience in 
seminary to provide a language frame for structuring and dis­
cussing these groundworks. I quickly began setting boundaries 
of approach and organizing a pattern from which to interpret 
educational objectives vis-a-vis aspects of religious experi­
ence. And, after some laudable progress, the legitimating 
characteristics of ritual, faith, stewardship and other reli­
gious commitments began to make up a very convincing model 
for interpreting human interaction in schools. It became ap­
parent, however, that this interpretive model was only my own 
sense-making process of projecting an understanding of the 
association that I perceived between religious and educational 
experience. Although this was quite meaningful to me and 
seemed to be a sufficient lens for relating two traditionally 
disparate domains of human experience, it was an interpretation 
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that depended on a phenomenological juxtaposition of activi­
ties, e.g., the ritual of school schedules, which to any 
other observer or interpreter may not relate whatsoever. Thus, 
the relativism inherent in the use of this interpretive model 
prevented me from making claims of universalizable and onto-
logical characteristics of intersubjective experience that I 
had hoped to uncover. 
In Interpretation; The Poetry of Meaning (1967) , Hopper 
and Miller approached the problem of whether or not a non-
objectifying language is possible. They were searching for a 
mode of language that manifests an openness for interpretation. 
Heidegger (1962) encouraged this openness by calling for a 
"going on the way toward meaning." In many ways, I have been 
after this same quality of openness for interpreting the 
language of intersubjectivity in schools. This search that 
I have undertaken has become an openning-up of the "way toward 
meaning" through participation in a broader dialogue of inter-
subjectivity with the theoretical traditions in education and 
hermeneutics. 
My journey through readings about the religious domain 
of experience has provided an opportunity for reflection that 
has ultimately led to a much greater understanding of the prob­
lems inherent in my preconceptions concerning this study. My 
recollections regarding interpretive techniques for theology 
have informed the language and historicity of not only the 
emerging form of this study but the content as well. 
3 
The hermeneutic art of interpretation that is common prac­
tice for gaining an understanding of religious texts has be­
come a useful model for other interests in historical texts, 
especially legal and literary interests. I have chosen a her­
meneutic approach to the "text" of human intersubjectivity in 
schools. This approach has taught me that any search for a 
better understanding is grounded in certain truths regarding 
how understanding itself is possible. And I have learned that 
my own research concerning intersubjectivity in schools has 
been a journey of reflecting upon my preconceptions as a re­
searcher and teacher and gaining a greater understanding by 
sharing and fusing these reflections with the texts of the 
study, i.e., the researched materials. 
The truths of interpretive understanding have been dis­
cussed by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, 1976) and will be related 
in detail in this dissertation's study of hermeneutics and 
the understanding of intersubjectivity in schools. Gadamer*s 
philosophical hermeneutics is the model of the art of inter­
pretation that I have used for the study. This model affirms 
awareness that the journey toward genuine understanding in­
cludes the experience of having first projected some preun-
derstandings or preconceptions that have been informed by our 
prejudices regarding the problem or subject that we are seek­
ing to understand. The use of such terms as "preconceptions," 
"prejudgments" and "prejudices" to translate Gadamer's German 
has been somewhat misleading as I have continued to research 
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his works. The English terms carry a pejorative connotation 
which is not intended by Gadamer. He simply wanted to bring 
out the fact that the interpreter's own language, experience, 
beliefs, etc. are a precondition for the initiation process 
of the interpretive understanding. 
The distinction Gadamer claims between "truth" and "method" 
in interpretation has been helpful in orienting my perspective 
regarding hermeneutics. The ontological truth that under­
standing is "more being than consciousness" (Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 239) is a clarification that has allowed me to establish 
some independence from the traditional structure of a method­
ological approach for demonstrating the legitimacy of my re­
search. This disestablishment from the more empirical and 
positivistic research procedures will be discussed throughout 
the paper and will be the central point of the fifth chapter 
which offers a model for applying a hermeneutic analysis that 
is more speculative than methodological. 
Chapter II will provide an historical description of 
the hermeneutic tradition since the early Greek teleology 
surrounding Hermes, the messenger of the gods, to the con­
temporary movement in philosophical hermeneutics that aban­
dons the structural claims of hermeneutical phenomenology. 
This review of historical hermeneutics contributes two impor­
tant dimensions to the study as a whole. It represents the 
research of what will be considered the horizons of thought 
regarding the topic. This research itself represents the 
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mediation of language and history that are conditions which 
influence acquisition of understanding any subject matter and, 
therefore, reflects a significant characteristic of my own 
hermeneutic endeavor with the material. Secondly, this re­
view of hermeneutics establishes the basis of my justifica­
tion for choosing an ontological, as opposed to an episte-
mological or phenomenological, perspective from which to con­
struct my own model of hermeneutic-dialectical experience. 
The third chapter offers a brief review of Jurgen 
Habermas' (1970, 1977) critical theory for the social sciences 
in contradistinction with Gadamer's (1975, 1976) philosophical 
hermeneutics. The Habermas-Gadamer debate represents a funda­
mental drift in the critical, humanistic tradition concerning 
the emancipatory opportunities found in self-reflection. Both 
theorizers claim the need to work for modes of reflexivity 
that allow people to examine the taken-for-granted assumptions 
that shape their discourse. Habermas' (1970) critical assump­
tions of how this discourse reflects the manipulative controls 
of authority and external power structures upon our actions 
and consciousness is quite different from Gadamer's theory 
which assumes the need to understand how our own historicity 
relates with authority. The question of whether or not author­
ity's use of control is for legitimate purposes is a matter 
that both Gadamer and Habermas find central to the intentions 
of self-reflection. The basic differences between the con­
sciously reasoned justification for self-reflection in 
Habermas' epistemology, and the historical and linguistic 
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conditions that define our beingness and inform our abilities 
to understand our relationship to authority via self-reflec-
tion in Gadamer's ontology, are discussed in order to clarify 
my adherence to Gadamer's theory. I have tried to allude to 
the implicit need for educators to gain from both theories by 
generalizing the benefits of Gadamer's perspective in coor­
dination with the recent developments in Habermas' (1979) 
theory of communicative competence. 
Through illustrating Gadamer's and Habermas' common 
interests in the language phenomenon, I have set the stage 
for defending the need to reaffirm the relativism inherent 
in our being conditioned by tradition. The tradition of the 
researcher as well as the teacher becomes the crucial charac­
teristic for conceptualizing an interpretive perspective from 
which to discuss both roles. And these roles help to mediate 
my intentions in Chapters IV and V with the previous parts 
of this dissertation's journey. 
Chapter IV represents the hermeneutic experience that 
the journey of research for this dissertation reflects. Having 
established that my own preunderstandings of research and my 
own personal history have informed the choices of literary 
sources, theoretical conceptualizations and metaphorical 
illustrations, i.e., methodologies or models, for describ­
ing the findings, I have participated one step further by 
actually reflecting upon these prejudices or preconceptions 
and discussed the details of the hermeneutic endeavor through 
7 
this self-reflective turn. This experience, in the written 
form, is also representative of Heidegger's (1962) notion of 
the "hermeneutic circle" which is discussed. The parts or 
fragments of my own horizon of experience have fused together 
with my projections of understanding regarding the subject 
matter, i.e., the readings of interpretive theory, and have 
brought me closer to the truth in understanding, or rather to 
a genuine conceptualization of the whole of this experience. 
As well, the whole has helped to inform the partial under­
standing of how the search for a greater understanding of 
intersubjectivity in schools is possible. This is apparent 
in the efforts to conceptualize an application of the herme­
neutic endeavor for analyzing teacher-student interactions. 
Thus, Chapter V offers a conceptualization of hermeneu­
tic methodology that reflects my understanding of herme­
neutic interpretation transformed into a structure of analysis. 
Gadamer (1975) has at times talked about the method of inter­
pretation as being completely determined by its object. I 
have chosen the object of teacher-student interaction 
(intersubjectivity) for constructing a model of hermeneutic-
dialectical analysis. 
This model, an up-dated projection since my earlier 
(Chapter I) understanding of Macdonaid's (1979) "dual-dia­
lectical" model, is further informed by the characteristics 
of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. Moreover, it repre­
sents the fusion of my personal horizons of meaning as a 
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teacher/researcher with the horizons of thought offered by 
Heinroch Ott (1967) who has also attempted to apply the her-
meneutic lens of analysis to dialogical relationships. This 
model of research is intended to prepare a structure, or 
rather present an emphasis on the phenomenological foundation, 
for the actual implementation of hermeneutic analysis for in­
terpreting a specific content of dialogue in a school setting. 
This projection is the coming-full-circle of hermeneutics 
toward an analysis of intersubjectivity amongst students and 
their teacher, myself as participant-teacher-hermeneuticist. 
This analysis has ultimately depended upon the wholistic image 
that I have sought regarding interpretive theory in the her­
meneutic tradition. Moreover, it also reflects the qualita­
tively speculative nature in the ontological characteristics 
of such an application of hermeneutics. 
Those conclusions which have been claimed as defining 
the being-in-relationship in the intersubjective or hidden di­
mension of the curriculum are conditioned by the tradition-
context of the situation used for analysis. The conclusions 
expressed in Chapter VI reflect the projection of meaning from 
my perspective as research hermeneuticist. A deeper under­
standing of the authority of the teacher as well as the dis­
tinction between valuing and understanding inform these con­
clusions . 
I will henceforth continue this introduction with a 
broader statement of intention that reflects my initial pro­
jection of meaning regarding the subject of interpretive 
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theory. My hope is that preconceptions of human intersubjec­
tivity and experiences in school will become apparent through 
these reflections. These preconceptions have been informed 
by my understanding of the work in the field pertaining to the 
critical tradition and interpretative interests in educational 
theory. 
The Hermeneutic Perspective of Research 
In "Research Methodology, Politics and Values" (SERA, 
19 78), James Macdonald posits the methodological problem: 
If we are to take seriously a critique of the posi-
tivist approach to research, and are to continue 
to engage in what one would still call research, 
then we are faced with a methodological quandary. 
How should we go about researching? (p. 3) 
This challenge has rapidly become an open issue, and has, as 
in Macdonald's own distinction between the methodological 
(constructivist) and the contextual approach to research, cre­
ated dialectical encounters which in themselves challenge the 
traditional philosophical assumptions of most curriculum 
theorists. These encounters reflect the need in educational 
research to seek greater awareness and understanding of the 
conditions, (human and historical), which inform our poten­
tial to relate and dialogically interact within our own values 
and shared knowledge as opposed to merely constructing and 
describing empirical means of knowledge acquisition, or what 
Henry Giroux (1979) describes as the "moribund assumptions" 
of contemporary theorists. The response which Macdonald, 
Giroux and others have been attracted to and which welcomes 
anti-positivistic interests in theorizing educational 
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curriculum will be referred to in this paper as the critical 
tradition of inquiry, often seeking interpretive methodologies 
that provide qualitative accounts of variables in the curricu­
lum, as opposed to quantitative measurements. After dis­
cussing the work of several representative educational theo­
rists, I hope to establish that this critical response in 
many ways represents approaches to phenomenology which are 
themselves as objective as the frame of reference of some 
scientific perspectives. 
It is the potential of the dialectic itself that interests 
me most in confronting Macdonald's question. Consequently, I 
approach his challenge as more than a matter of the need for 
alternative paradigms of "research." In and through the 
self-reflective prerequisites which most interpretive or criti­
cal inquiries into human sciences demand can be found yet 
another challenge perhaps even more fundamental than the 
classification of methodology and research. This a priori 
requirement calls forth an acknowledgement that the presup­
positions, the prejudgments, and the preunderstandings of 
the researcher are important in determining the nature of the 
research itself. That which is chosen to be researched re­
flects the underlying intent, the telos or purpose, of the 
researcher. And, for this matter, the discoveries them­
selves are means for weighing the values or interests of the 
researcher. 
This, to me, elicits the need to recognize that I can 
not ignore the tradition (historicity, temporality) which has 
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informed my judgment. I cannot set aside the controlling 
agents of efficiency, design, manipulation, and product orien­
tation that have for years caused a social evolution and a 
personal socialization of knowledge, interests and intention-
ality towards instrumentality, objective control, and pre­
dictability. And yet, in acknowledging the biased nature of 
these fetters and through conscious and consistent reflec­
tion upon the effect of these pre-judgments on my research 
encounters, I can attempt to see beyond (transcend) these 
covert and inhibiting subleties. 
My mind's eye, in search of an expressive mode for demon­
strating my interests (prejudgments) in the conditioned na­
ture of relationships in education—amongst students, teachers 
and the curriculum—will assume a hermeneutical perspective. 
This approach, what will be periodically referred to as the 
reflective art of understanding, is nothing more than what 
these words, here and now, represent. For the language that 
I am entrapped (by the boundaries of tradition) to put to 
use and the dialogue that I choose to momentarily entertain, 
reflect the ontological significance of "research" that seeks 
to explore the groundworks of research itself. 
As Palmer (1969) writes of Hans Georg Gadamer's apprai­
sal of the hermeneutical situation, the attitude of the in­
terpreter/researcher is one of expectancy, of waiting for 
something to happen: 
He recognizes that he is not a knower seeking his 
object and taking possession of it. . . . The 
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methodical discipline is one designed to restrain 
his own will to master. He is not so much a knower 
as an experiencer, the encounter is not a concep­
tual grasping of something but an event in which 
a world opens itself up to him. Insofar as each 
interpreter stands in a new horizon, the event that 
comes to language in the hermeneutical experience 
is something new that emerges, something that did 
not exist before. (p. 209) 
Although to Gadamer this event is grounded in linguis-
ticality and made possible by the dialectical encounter with 
the meaning of a text, to the interpreter as educational re­
searcher, (studying interactions amongst humans and between 
agents and the curriculum), the text of dialogue is also 
significantly the hermeneutical experience that finds ful­
fillment through the emergence of relationships which did not 
exist before. Consequently, as well, any research, even the 
most mundane questioning of one to another in our everyday 
lives, represents the problematical issues of meaning and 
existence that in themselves signify (through the potential 
of awareness and understanding) the hidden meaning of our 
interactions. The tacit meaning, or rather the implicitly 
conditioned nature, of our interactions can be interpreted 
by exploring the language phenomena that mediates relation­
ships . 
Existential phenomenologists who use the hermeneutical 
approach, such as ethnomethodologists, Garfinkel (1967) and 
Mehan (1975) as examples, and hermeneutical phenomenolo­
gists, such as Paul Ricoeur (1966), describe the experience-
expression link of language as the phenomenological means of 
interpreting the "common sense" meaning (ethnomethodological 
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interests) or the "double meaning" (semantical and structural 
hermeneutical interests) inherent in our interactions. Al­
though language does reflect how we know and what we value in 
knowing, the phenomenological measuring sticks in linguistic 
research, and especially in the search for such phenomena as 
"indexicals" in ethnomethodology, still create a distancing 
and a sense of objectivity between the researcher and the sub­
ject of interest which controls the relationship and inter­
feres with the ontological nature of the relationship, i.e., 
the conditioned nature of human beings in relationship. It 
is at this point that research, as a retrieval of meaning 
or an intended rediscovery of the subject matter through in­
vestigation into factual phenomena, must be reminded of its 
groundworks: that there exists a reality in the relationship 
itself between the researcher and the researched which can 
only be interpreted or understood through a dialogical or 
dialectical (mediating) encounter, (as opposed to the mere 
reconstruction of facts). Dialogue becomes the means of re­
search which demands the most intense reflexivity and parti­
cipation oh the part of the researcher. 
As a researcher, attempting to establish the viability 
of self-understanding and self-reflection as a "methodological" 
variable in research, I too must periodically seek to under­
stand my own conditioned status. And yet, I must also affirm 
the dialectical encounter with the tradition being researched. 
Only then will it be possible to begin interpreting the 
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meaningfulness of understanding as "being." I intend to offer 
a model of dialogical/dialectical "methodology," based on the 
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, 1976) 
in such a way that the ontological significance of research 
and the understanding of intersubjectivity can be made more 
clear. 
Gadamer*s (1975) notion of linguisticality, the conditioned 
and existential lens for understanding the groundworks of phe-
nomenological interests (and their epistemological and axio-
logical associative interests), will be helpful in satisfying 
the "methodological" expectations of this research. I will 
continue, however, to question the methodological implications 
of any endeavor into ontology. I will recognize the useful­
ness of the traditional language of research, simply because 
the notion of method does not necessarily carry with it the 
empirical implications and boundaries of systematization or 
hierchical and closed measures of process. Methodology can 
and should be considered as any approach which is taken towards 
research—even the most spontaneous and undefined processes. 
The process of inquiry that I wish to use in my research 
has a life of its own and is often filled with developments 
that are unanticipated and unintended. This in itself sug­
gests the ontological importance of inquiry and the condi­
tioned status of the inquirer—the situatedness in tradition— 
which can neither be forgotten nor avoided as long as onto­
logical concerns remain fundamental to epistemological and 
axiological interests. 
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In affirming hermeneutics as form and content of research, 
I must be prepared to seek an understanding of my own prejudices 
and valued interests as I proceed. Moreover, the interest in 
synthesizing the claims of critical theorists and the philo­
sophical hermeneutic tradition, both insisting upon a self-
reflective mode of inquiry, represents my own approach for 
establishing the credibility of ontological concerns. 
Some Questions for the Phenomenological 
Tradition of Research 
Efforts to reconceptualize the intention, process, and 
effect of educational research have begun to polarize and 
form boundaries behind which differing philosophical posi­
tions can vie for influence and attention. Some contem­
porary curriculum theorists, including Max Van Manen (OISE, 
1977), Dwayne Huebner (1975), James Macdonald (1975, 1978, 
1979) and Henry Giroux (1979, 1980) have helped to identify 
the teleological and ideological viewpoints that are reflected 
in these perspectives. The classification of epistemological 
interests (knowledge-oriented interests) provided by pheno­
menological sociology, especially the works of Peter Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann (1967) and Alfred Schutz (1970), and the 
critical sociologists, Jurgen Habermas (1971), Paulo Freire 
(1973), and Anthony Giddens (1977), has influenced the 
thoughts of these educational theorists. My decision to 
choose the generally shared perspective of Giroux, Huebner, 
Macdonald and Van Manen, is not, however, a reflection of 
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an agreement with their sociological bent towards epistemologi-
cal and axiological categorizations (of knowledge interests 
grounded in particular value orientations). Although I sup­
port the humanistic claims for a serious acknowledgement of 
the subjectivity inherent in the choices of research (inten­
tion) and in the product of research (effect), it is impor­
tant at this point to mention that the sociological Weltanschauung 
(worldview) in its phenomenological orientation, often over­
looks more philosophical (existential and ontological) ration­
alizations for research. Moreover, the encouragement of 
dialogue with educational theorists who assume a sociological 
perspective is intended to facilitate the exploration of 
such issues as: How do epistemological and axiological per­
spectives in research—either in their theoretical or methodo­
logical assumptions--relate to the assumptions of research 
aimed at the study of human "being" or the meaning of being 
and human relationships (i.e., philosophical, ontological 
and existential notions)? Does research as connoting 
a methodology and system or process, offer a means for dis-
covering/creating/building an understanding and meaning 
(i.e., of universal human conditions), beyond the shared know­
ledge (social knowledge) of subject-subject or subject-object 
relationships within the subject matter of the study alone? 
Or must it be necessary for the researcher himself/herself to 
share his/her own pre-understandings within the study itself 
in order to manifest such an understanding? And, can an 
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emphasis on the phenomenological status of human "being"— 
demonstrated in reality-creating activities such as language 
interaction (dialogue), work (labor) and other forms of 
observable, yet symbolic human activity--provide a means for 
gaining insight into the immanently hidden dimension of hu­
man relationships that gives meaning to the specifically 
educational activities (curriculum) which inform our relation­
ships in schools? Also, intended through such dialogue is 
an effort to combine the methodological and phenomenological 
presuppositions of traditional curriculum research with a 
more philosophical aim of avoiding the strict structure of 
method in order to interpret the phenomenal representations 
of our existential condition of being-in-the-curriculum. 
This is not intended to imply that a shift in paradigms from 
action-interests to being-interests should ignore the wisdom 
of the phenomenological and contextual tradition, "reborn" 
(reconceptualized) through recent research theories in edu­
cation. 
An approach which may reflect yet another reconceptua-
lization suggests that in dialogue with other epistemologi-
cal perspectives, it is helpful to combine the hermeneutic 
or interpretive interests that rely on a phenomenological 
inquiry and provide an understanding of the ontological con-
ditionedness of human "being." This interest in going beyond 
the phenomenological tradition in research is also based on 
the contention that the need for "thick" descriptive data, 
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as apparent in such research procedures as ethnographic and 
ethnomethodological studies, is itself an empirical prerequi­
site for validity and reliability that controls the interests, 
process and outcome of phenomenological studies. 
The contextualist approaches as described by Macdonald 
(SERA, 1978) do, however, attempt to affirm the researcher's 
participation in their studies, and most speak to the latently 
viable, qualitative interests that must reject the dominant 
model of empirical validity in order to avoid the traps of 
objective "participation." Most critical interests in the 
subjectivity of research are, however, not without their own 
need for coherency and cohesiveness if they are to maintain 
momentum in establishing both humanistic and philosophical 
alternatives to the dominant research models. What follows 
is an attempt to explicate and review the sociologically and 
psychologically influenced alternative modes of research as 
have been described by Macdonald, Huebner, Van Manen and 
Giroux. Dialogue with these approaches will hopefully clarify 
the move towards an interest in the debate between the criti­
cal theorists and hermeneutics, (particularly, the Habermas-
Gadamer debate), which may possibly set the stage for relat­
ing epistemology and ontology and for a discussion of her­
meneutics in the educational setting. 
The Interpretive Mode and Educational Theory 
The response during the 1970's to the challenge for 
theorizing new paradigms for educational research has, as 
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mentioned earlier, created a number of ideological boundaries. 
James Macdonald (1979) has offered a critique of the major 
components, as described by Kohlberg and Mayer (1972), of 
these ideologies. As a philosophical comparison, Macdonald 
distinguishes between the ontological, epistemological and 
axiological considerations assumed by the Romantic, Develop­
mental, and Cultural Transmission ideologies. In general, 
Macdonald's analysis states that the knowledge and value 
orientations of these three ideologies are idealistic assump­
tions concerning the interaction between "inner cognitive 
structures" and the outer realities of the social environ­
ment. None provides adequate reflective consideration to the 
social structures of the environment (social contexts) 
that influence human development quite often through unques­
tioned authority and power which creates "hierarchical domi­
nance and submission patterns." As Macdonald had implied 
earlier in "Research: Methodology, Politics and Values" (1978), 
these ideologies promote a generally methodological approach 
to educational research, or what Magoon (1977) classifies as 
constructivist social research, which, in its objectivity, is 
"actually an acceptance of the 'way things are'" (Macdonald, 
1978, p. 6). Macdonald also critiques a fourth perspective, 
the radical ideology, which, in response to the political 
value vacuum formed by the previous three ideologies, fails 
to "adequately account for the tacit dimension of culture" 
because of its materialistic and ameliorative focus in an 
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historical (objective) frame of reference (1979, p. 4). The 
"cultural realities" of Macdonald's interest are considered 
with a progressive, developmental perspective, and yet with 
an effort to transcend the technological (materialistic) 
world, which is "in effect an externalization of hidden con­
sciousness of human potential" (1979, p. 6). Macdonald's 
(1979) transcendental developmental ideology is offered, more­
over because of the ontological and phenomenological deficien­
cies of the other four. Macdonald tries to deal with these 
inadequacies in his model of "dual dialecticism" (p.9) that 
establishes a "reflective transaction of human consciousness" 
not only within situational contexts but also a dialectic 
between the tacit domain of human values (subjective pre-
understandings) and subjectively explicit knowledge (beliefs, 
wishes). This phenomenological assessment defines the self's 
active reflection and participation in context and the onto­
logical considerations of human nature's entrapment in a tacit 
dimension of "pre and unconscious da^.a." If, however, the 
context of such "reflective transaction" is obviously just 
as much an aspect of the social situation in which the self 
acts as the situation informed by individual ideas and beliefs, 
then the question remains as to why Macdonald chooses a per­
spective which weighs so heavily upon the "personal values" 
of the individual and which relies on support from psychologi­
cal theories, especially the theories of C. G. Jung and 
William James, that dwell on the inner potential and the 
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phenomenological process of individuation. Although Macdonald 
(1979) assumes that such psychological explanations do lead 
us to come to grips with human nature, we should question this 
orientation toward an ontology of individuation that short 
changes the reciprocal affect of the context itself. In other 
words, is it not just as important to come to an understanding 
of the tradition-context which both conditions the situation 
as well as the individual's personal values when charac­
terizing the ontological domain of interaction. 
Psychological models of interpretation which posit de­
velopmental criteria that assume progressive expectations 
often reflect the biases of psychological interests and should 
be valued more often for the structure (form) of their re­
search than for offering explanations of human conditionedness 
in a temporal and historical context (i.e. , the subject matter 
of ontological research). Although the interests of philo­
sophical hermeneutics are responsive to what Macdonald de­
scribes as the aim of the centering self (1979, p. 16ff), the 
art of understanding inherent in the hermeneutics of every­
day life is itself considered as a dialectical process toward 
understanding, reflecting an ongoing dialogue between the 
historical tradition and the immediate interests of the self, 
(informed as it is by the immediate tradition), and not neces­
sarily as Macdonald claims, "only known after the fact" (p. 24), 
or rather, the product of knowing. Unlike the process of the 
individual's psychological development, understanding is the 
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emergence of truth which is conditioned by and conditions the 
relationship of inter-subjectivity. 
Phenomenologically speaking, understanding could be il­
lustrated as a mediative reality that informs and is informed 
by relationships (through language) and subsequently is more 
uniquely determined by openness to the meaning of such re­
lationships than either through a strictly subjective self-
reflection or through the transaction of the self with the 
environmental context. By transforming Macdonald's illustra­
tion of his model of dual dialecticism, the mediating struc­
ture of understanding should perhaps be included as a possible 
consequence of the reflective transactions. 
Tacit Knowledge Environment 
Reflective 
Transactions 
Explicit Knowledge Situations 
Aesthetic Transaction 
Macdonald's "Dual Dialecticism" (1979, p. 9) 
Tacit Knowledge Environment 
Reflective "Otherness" 
Transactions 
Explicit Knowledge 
Understanding Situations 
Mediation 
Conditionedness 
Meaningfulness 
Hermeneutic-Dialectical Experience 
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What should be inferred from the model of hermeneutic-
dialectical experience is that some residue of reflective 
transactions does not result in or encourage an understanding 
relationship. (This could be explained by the multiplicity 
of barriers, especially in language, that inhibit understand­
ing in the phenomenal world). On the other hand, this model 
does depict the reality of mediation which exists between the 
self and the world (perhaps through conversation with another 
self—e.g., students, teacher, researcher, the subject matter 
of the curriculum). Dialectical relationships lack meaning 
without openness, awareness, and acknowledgment of such a 
"synthesis" of reflective transactions. Certainly, the onto-
logical realm of the dialectic, the meaning world, is depen­
dent on the potential relatedness of the tacit domain and the 
objective environment. The dialectics of hermeneutics de­
fines this realm as that reality which can neither be claimed 
by the self nor others in relations, (subjectively or objec­
tively) . This realm of meaning exists as a result of the 
ongoing dialectic or dialogue—i.e., the relationship itself. 
Moreover, unlike the psychological models of reflective and 
transactional behavior, the philosophical ground of hermeneu-
tical reflection is not so oriented to the subjectivity of 
the self in search of a way of knowing (e.g. , the epistemologi­
cal structure of being). Consequently, interaction in a 
particular context such as in curriculum activities in schools, 
is considered more influenced by intersubjectivity than by 
individual self-reflection. 
This dialogue with Macdonald's thoughts is based on my 
use of Gadamer's (1976)' philosophical hermeneutics which pre­
sents a radical rethinking of earlier hermeneutic phenomenology 
concerning the idea of verstehen, or understanding. While the 
earlier authors treated verstehen primarily as a method where­
by historians or social scientists gain a systematic access 
to the "subject matter," (usually a written text) , generally 
for understanding the intentions of the authors'. Gadamer 
regards it as the very condition and mode of human subjectivity. 
To Gadamer, language is the medium, the mediating reality, 
of understanding. And understanding is not only conditioned 
by the language structure. The historical context of under­
standing and also the aesthetic tradition of the culture are 
significant. 
Gadamer critiques aesthetic consciousness in his intro­
duction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (1976, p. xxvi) and 
develops a concept of knowledge and truth about aesthetic 
experience that transcends the traditional concept of the 
observer's objective awareness of the aesthetic object. Gadamer1 
concept of the true experience of aesthetics involves the un­
derstanding of meaning through an account of the observer's 
interactions with the aesthetic object. Although Macdonald 
credits the aesthetic dimension of understanding in claiming 
that "understanding others is not a 'useful' procedure in the 
sense that knowing is, in that it does not provide the basis 
fox" planning, manipulating and calculating," he does subjugate 
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the reality of relationships to understanding in saying that 
"understanding provides the ground for relating" (1979, p. 24). 
The hermeneutic tradition of Gadamer suggests that under­
standing is the practical (rational) outcome of relatedness 
(intersubjectivity). Moreover, Macdonald's emphasis on the 
importance and uniqueness of personal knowledge in aiding the 
"construction" of the "culture of human life" seems to ignore 
the significance of the language phenomena as affecting or 
changing the fundamental nature of knowledge. This is cer­
tainly important to the hermeneutic tradition which claims 
that language informs our condition of being human and conse­
quently our shared knowledge. Of course, Macdonald does dis­
tinguish between social knowledge and personal knowledge, and 
he finds support in Polanyi's (1967) idea of the tacit dimen­
sion of knowledge as well as Berger and Luckmann's (1967) 
descriptions of the social construction of knowledge. 
In discussing tacit knowing (p. 13), Macdonald assumes 
Polanyi's classification of understanding in the realm of the 
tacit dimension. Consequently, if our tacit knowledge remains 
implicit and hidden, then understanding itself can never be 
fulfilled. This corresponds with David Hoy's (1978) analysis 
of Gadamer's version of contextualism which holds that inter­
pretive understanding is also conditioned by preunderstandings, 
as is our tacit knowledge. However, Gadamer recognizes that 
these preunderstandings themselves are conditioned by the 
situation, i.e., the context of the interpreter in an aesthe­
tic, linguistic and historical tradition. In describing the 
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conditioned nature of all understanding and knowledge, Gadamer 
states that: 
. . . even when we ourselves, as historically en­
lightened thinkers, are fundamentally clear about 
the historical conditionedness of all human think­
ing and hence about our conditionedness, we have 
not ourselves taken an unconditioned stand. . . . 
The consciousness of the conditionedness does not 
in any way negate this conditionedness. 
Macdonald (197 8) also alludes to this conditionedness in 
referring to Gunner Myrdahl (1969) who says that in education: 
. . . there is a lack of awareness. Even today 
that, in searching for the truth, the student, 
like all human beings whatever they try to accom­
plish, is influenced by traditions, by his environ­
ment, and by his personality. (p. 7) 
Macdonald recognizes the conditioned status of educational re­
search and especially of the subjectivity of the researcher. 
He concludes in "Research: Methodology, Politics and Values" 
that "all educational research has intentions which are a 
priori to the research" (1979, p. 9). These intentions are 
reflected in the questions that initiate research, and to 
Macdonald as well as the critical tradition of inquiry, the 
questions are all expressions of our interests, and are phrased 
in terms of our values. To the hermeneuticist however, these 
questions are not only conditioned by our values but also are 
the conditions themselves of our manner of relating meaning­
fully (via dialectics or dialogue). Moreover, for Gadamer, 
our preunderstandings as researchers can be made conscious by 
our willingness to defend the appropriateness of our under­
standing (via self-reflection) and to justify the legitimacy 
of our research. And yet Gadamer does show agreement with 
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Macdonald and Polanyi in claiming that since such self-reflec­
tion can never lead to clarification of all the preunder-
standings (tacit knowledge), all research/interpretation must 
remain partial and contextual. 
Although through this dialogue there seems to be some 
implicit and potentially apparent connection (or convergence) 
between the thoughts of Macdonald and Gadamer, the generally 
epistemological interests of Macdonald's transcendental ideology, 
especially with its subjective and psychological emphasis, does 
not speak as directly to the ontological concerns of human 
being and meaning which assume more intersubjective, univer-
salizable significance. 
M. J. Max Van Manen (OISE, 1977) has also relied on an 
epistemological perspective in discussing alternatives to the 
empirical-analytic approach in research. However, unlike 
Macdonald (1975, 1979) who seems to base his opinion of the 
hermeneutical/interpretive mode on the work of the earlier 
structural tradition in hermeneutics, Van Manen acknowledges 
the more meta-theoretical possibilities of interpretive in­
quiries. According to Van Manen (197 7), the metalevel of 
"research into research" helps to identify neglected areas of 
research and helps to "make explicit the epistemological sup­
positions which form a basis for motivating new inquiry" (p. 1). 
As in the work of Macdonald in Pinar, 1975, Van Manen 
outlines social education research orientations based on 
Habermas' schema for categorizing social scientific research 
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(i.e., interpretive, empirical-analytic, and critical inquiry). 
Van Manen attempts to distinguish the relationships of these 
dominant inquiry modes and focuses on their practical signi­
ficance, claiming that the interpretive science of hermeneu-
tics shares a general theoretical orientation with phenomenology, 
ethnomethodology and other analytical means for "providing 
commonalities of understanding" (i.e. , a humanistic, consensus 
orientation). Van Manen, in turn, lists the "human engineer­
ing" (technical) applications of the empirical-analytic sciences 
and the emancipatory designs of the critical theories. 
In emphasizing the participant observation technique 
as an interpretive mode of making sense shared by hermeneu-
tics along with phenomenology and ethnomethodology, Van Manen 
fails to recognize the specifically ontological significance 
to research suggested in a philosophical approach to hermeneu-
tics. This interest for research transcends the objectivity 
of the researcher and suggests a self-reflective approach 
that encourages more than just participant observation as a 
mode of interpretive inquiry. Ontological interests require 
more than just a "scenic understanding" (e.g., the ethno-
methodological understanding of the taken-for-granted world) 
or a fundamental "insight" into the "nature of knowledge in 
consciousness" as in the phenomenological studies. A search 
for meaning hermeneutically assumes that a dialogue between 
the researcher and the researched exists and that a self-
reflective turn (what will be referred to later as the 
"hermeneutic turn" or "circle") is necessary for the researcher 
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to comprehend his/her own pre-understandings as having an im­
pact on the subject matter of research and the dialogue it­
self. 
I believe that Van Manen has misinterpreted Gadamer's 
hermeneutics in his reference to the notion of "social wisdom" 
(1977, p. 10). Gadamer's (1976) use of Aristotle's "phronesis" 
(p. 46) which can be better translated as "practical wisdom," 
is not an understanding of phenomenological experience of 
coming-to-self-consciousness or, in Van Manen1s explanation, 
a "nonobjectifiable accumulation of 'understandings.'" Gadamer 
sees this condition of wisdom not as a greater knowing, but 
as an openness to more experience. He writes in Truth and 
Method (1975) that: 
. . . openness includes the recognition that I 
must let something in myself count against my­
self, even if there were no other who would 
make it count against me. . . . The hermeneuti-
cal consciousness has its completion not in a 
methodological self-certainty, but rather in the 
same readiness for experience that distinguishes 
the experienced person from one who is dogmatically 
constrained. (pp. 343-344) 
Consequently, to assume that hermeneutics should be considered 
a "science" or even a phenomenological "bracketing" or under­
standing is to deny it of this "openness" to the conditions 
of potential meaning that determine its existential and onto-
logical significance. The taken-for-granted common meanings 
of ordinary life and the social realities which are made 
visible through such phenomenological devices as dialogue, 
are simply the tools (medium) of the researcher (hermeneuticist) 
who seeks an even deeper meaning of human understanding. 
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The four chapters which Dwayne Huebner has contributed 
as "reconceptualizations" of curriculum interests in Pinar's 
Curriculum Theorizing (1975) each typify the interests of 
philosophical hermeneutics in language, man's temporality, 
and interpretive understanding. Moreover, Huebner accepts 
Heidegger's (1962) phenomenological ontology of man's "being-
in-the-world" as a significant condition of temporality which 
influences the possibilities of the educator and educational 
researcher in transcending the dialectical encounters between 
individuals and society (immediate context) and in understand­
ing the meaning of relatedness (sharing) in "the rhythms of 
continuity and change, of necessity and freedom" (Huebner, 
1975, p. 247). Heidegger's strong influence upon Gadamer 
(1975) and philosophical hermeneutics will be established in 
Chapter II but for now, it should be apparent that the in-
tentionality of our language use and of our activities is an 
aspect of the curricularist's search and thus reflects a meta-
theoretical interest in the phenomenal world for helping us 
to understand a more fundamental meaning to such phenomena. 
Huebner seems to differ somewhat with hermeneutics in 
his discussion of man's relationship with language. Although 
he acknowledges man's situatedness in language, as he says, 
we are "inevitably caught in it" (1975, p. 265), he assumes 
that man has the potential to transcend the confines of lan­
guage. The paradoxical relationship between man and his 
language is, to Huebner, an important reminder that the 
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different intentions and uses of language—which 'he catego­
rizes for curricularists to be descriptive, explanatory, con­
trolling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative--must 
be researched historically in order to find the "origins" of 
the curricularist's (or researcher's) "ways of talking" (1975, 
p. 254). This concern with the use of language is a pheno-
menological approach to a deeper understanding of the human. 
To philosophical hermeneutics, language does have a self-
transcending characteristic in its uses. But more importantly, 
understanding through linguistics is capable of transcending 
the limits of any particular language use. (This point is 
also helpful in defending against the criticism of relativism 
suggested of hermeneutics. This criticism will be referred 
to in the next chapter.) Consequently, language use alone, 
as reflecting a tacit intentionality (of control, legitima­
tion, etc.), is not all the researcher needs to study (research) 
in order to seek an understanding of such intentionality. It 
is the understanding itself which establishes the meaning 
inherent in the valued intentions of the language use. This 
meaning reflects a conditionedness, universal in nature, that 
is not simply a conscious choice (reflective understanding) 
for interpreting our relationships, but a realization of a 
pre-reflective understanding of being from within a concrete 
situation that has intrinsic relation to the interpreter's/ 
researcher's past and future. 
In his Philosophical Hermeneutics (1976), Gadamer re­
flects agreement with Heidegger's (1962) assertion that language 
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and understanding are inseparable structural aspects of human 
being-in-the-world, not simply optional functions that man 
engages in or does not engage in at will. He states that: 
What is given in language is not primarily a re­
lation to this or that object, or event to a 
field of objects, but rather a relation to the 
whole of being, a relation that we neither con­
sciously create nor control and objectify as 
science does its objects. Our possession of 
language, or better, our possession by language, 
is the ontological condition for our understand­
ing of the relations that address us. (p. 151) 
Perhaps the lens which prevents the sociological and 
phenomenological-minded research alternatives from "crossing 
the path" of the ontological interests in hermeneutics is 
their orientation to research as a science. Even Huebner, in 
"The Tasks of the Curricular Theorist" (1975, pp. 250-269), 
discusses research as the "development of a form to 'fit' the 
facts" of the researcher's discoveries. Also he describes the 
form as a "man-made institution" for discovering and creating 
other forms to interpret the phenomena of man's relatedness. 
Thus, this form-making can be considered a human science which 
has a legitimating function of making sense of its discoveries 
(scientific data, language statements, etc.). In a sense then, 
research as form-making is a methodology for fitting together 
the realities of the social/phenomenal world in such a way 
that the researcher's ("form-maker's") intentions can be 
objectified. Although the beliefs and values of the research­
er are made clear by the methodological, yet human, science, 
Huebner's model of research, reflecting the sociological 
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tradition in conceptualizing educational research, continues 
to boost scientific methodology, although certainly not em­
piricism, as the ultimate definition of meaning and truth. 
Henry Giroux (1979, 1980) has begun to question the lan­
guage and concepts in education's curriculum field. In dis­
cussing the "interpretative rationality" as a dominant under­
pinning to educational practice, Giroux (1980) distinguishes 
the concepts of appropriation, intentionality, and intersub-
jectivity as central to the hermeneutic experience. He em­
phasizes the attention that the interpretive activity gives to 
teacher-student relationships and the relationship between 
epistemology and intentionality (p. 12). However, Giroux 
claims that interpretive accounts of experience "lack an 
adequate notion either of institutions or history" and are 
"overburdened" with a phenomenological focus on subjectivity 
that neglects the issue of pre-categorical conditioning" (p. 12). 
Obviously, Giroux is unaware of the recent developments in 
the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer (1976). He seems 
to be relating the interests of hermeneutic phenomenology 
with the tradition of interpretation that offers a rediscovery 
of the subjective meaning in a text or a relationship. Gadamer1s 
ontological option to this epistemological exercise will be 
discussed in detail in Chapters II and III. Giroux like 
Macdonald (1979^, Van Manen (1977) and Huebner (1975) specie 
fically attacks the knowledge-oriented interests of the social 
sciences which continue to objectify their theories and modes 
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of research. Giroux (1979) discusses his interest/prejudices 
in theory as having "its center of gravity in its social po­
tential for insight into the nature of truth and meaning" 
(p. 250)„ This is a new, ontological interest that "situates 
its assumptions and modes of inquiry in both understanding 
and determining ends" (p. 250). 
Giroux's (1979) call for such an ontological language of 
truth and meaning for curricularists is obviously a new twist 
in the search for alternative research interests. But if 
Giroux is to join the ranks of the "post-critical reconcep-
tualists," (including Macdonald, Van Manen and Huebner) in 
their rejection of the universal claims (e.g., truth and 
meaning) inherent in an ontological frame of reference, he must 
first convince the critical tradition, established through the 
thoughts of Jurgen Habermas (1971), who has consistently in­
vited debate with the hermeneutical traditions that hold 
such a perspective, that knowledge interests are grounded in 
ontological concerns with human understanding. 
All of these educators, Macdonald, Huebner, Van Manen, 
and Giroux, in their search for a way out of objectivism in 
curriculum theorizing, agree that the empirical-analytic 
methodology of research ignores the grounding of knowledge in 
human interests. They each have suggested in some way that 
the victory of the scientific method over science, as de­
scribed by Jurgen Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests 
(1971), has created a formalized language and an objectivism 
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in educational research which establishes a "monologic" 
abstraction of fact from value. Macdonald (1975) has especially 
sided with Habermas' critique of this formalistic positivism 
and, as has been discussed, he has joined Habermas in pro­
posing the need for a self-reflective science (and educational 
ideology) in an attempt to "transcend the problems of objec­
tivism and scientism" (p. 28). Also evidenced in Macdonald's 
and Van Manen's theoretical agreements with Habermas is the 
assumption that of the three fundamental cognitive human 
interests—control, consensus/understanding, and emancipation— 
the value orientation of the interests in understanding and 
critical consciousness are the only viable options if relation­
ships in education are to reflect humanistic realities and 
concerns. Unfortunately, and as a result of Habermas' (1971) 
critique of the hermeneutic understanding of meaning, what he 
calls consensual interests, most of these educational theorists 
have discredited the potential of a hermeneutical approach 
as an alternative to the empirical and dominant scientific 
model for research. 
Macdonald (1975) has interpreted Habermas as claiming that 
hermeneutics, as a mode of understanding, is grounded in an 
objectivist stance that divorces itself from self-reflection. 
This is true of the structuralist tradition in phenomenologi-
cal hermeneutics whose interpretive research led towards a 
heavy dependence on reconstruction of the original intentions 
of the author and on linguistic analysis or semantics, as in 
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the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher (1959) and Dilthey (1957). 
This attention to the objectivity of grammatical and rhetori­
cal forms has a tendency to lose sight of the hermeneutical 
interpretive potential for opening doors to a greater under­
standing of "being-ness," an ontological understanding. 
In order to clarify the distinction between the pheno-
menological tradition in hermeneutics (and its association 
with Habermas1 critical theory) and the later works of 
Gadamer in philosophical hermeneutics, it will be necessary 
to journey through the historical unfolding of the hermeneutic 
tradition. 
A close analysis of the hermeneutic tradition will help 
in discussing the exchange between Habermas and Gadamer 
(Chapter III) that has ultimately led me to choose the philo-
sopical/ontological perspective for describing the experience 
of intersubjectivity and for providing an interpretive model 
to better understand interactions in schools. 
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CHAPTER II 
TRADITIONS IN HERMENEUTICS 
In order to begin a discussion of the hermeneutical per­
spective for understanding curriculum in education it is im­
portant to briefly relate the characteristics of Gadamer's 
(1975, 1976) philosophical orientation, (which has been de­
scribed as a "radical rethinking of Verstehen", that is, of 
understanding), as distinguished from the other, perhaps more 
reknown, traditions in hermeneutic phenomenology. The dia­
logue which has evolved between these traditions has encouraged 
Gadamer's rethinking of an ontological perspective quite dis­
tinct from the methodological assumptions in what is referred 
to as structural (phenomenological) hermeneutics. Moreover, 
this encounter of interpretive views helps me to situate 
Gadamer's notions of historicality, linguisticality, inter-
subjectivity, self-reflection, openness, and the dialectic 
(as method) as inherently useful characteristics for dis­
cussing our hermeneutical experience in and with the cur-
cirulum in education. It is necessary to take some time to 
encourage an encounter of Gadamer's perspective with the 
earlier and other contemporary traditions in hermeneutics. 
Classical Hermeneutics 
The most important distinction between Gadamer's claims 
for a philosophical hermeneutics and the traditional uses of 
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hermeneutics is Gadamer's questioning of hermeneutics and 
theoretical reflection as a "technique." Harvey Cox (19 73) 
has explained that: 
Hermeneutics comes from the name of the Greek god 
Hermes (Mercury, in the West), whose main job was 
to carry messages among the gods and from the gods 
to men. Hermeneutics is the study of messages, or 
more exactly, the study of how one interprets the 
meaning of texts. (p. 146) 
This original function of the hermeneutic endeavor quickly 
evolved into a practice of regaining or translating the his­
torical meaning or the "hidden" meaning of literary and reli­
gious writings. 
Literary critical hermeneutics has become a tool of the 
humanists for reviving classical literature. Also, the scrip­
tural (exegetical) hermeneutics has been important to Bible 
reformers searching for the meaning of the Bible text that 
has become alien and unavailable. In both traditions, her­
meneutics claims to reveal, by specialized techniques, the 
original meaning of the texts, humanistic literature and the 
Bible. 
In discussing the questionableness of these romantic 
hermeneutics, Gadamer writes in Truth and Method (1975) that: 
. . . because understanding as such has become a 
problem, theoretical reflection is no longer a 
technique guiding the practice of critic or 
theologian. . . . The effort of understanding 
is found wherever there is no immediate under­
standing, i.e., whenever the possibility of 
misunderstanding has to be reckoned with. (p. 157) 
Although Friederich Schleiermacher (1959) introduced the 
idea of a "universal hermeneutics," that the experience of the 
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alien and the possibility of misunderstanding is a universal 
one, Gadamer (1975) was the first to respond philosophically 
to the phenomenological presuppositions of the classical 
hermeneutic task. These presuppositions directed the atten­
tion of Wilhelm Dilthey (1957) and later Paul Ricoeur (1966), 
whose phenomenological interests have helped to encourage 
Gadamer's insistence on the more existential notion of onto­
logy as it relates to understanding and interpretation (Wolff, 
1975, pp. 74-77) . 
The Phenomenological Tradition in Hermeneutics 
Dilthey (1957) is considered to have initiated the first 
phase of the development of the hermeneutic tradition "out 
of" the classical (romantic) uses of textual interpretations. 
Dilthey introduced the notion of understanding as involving 
explanation (erklaren). In studying human conduct, what he 
called the human sciences or Geisteswissenschaften, Dilthey 
attempted to establish similar standards of "objective" 
assessment as those paramount in the natural sciences. Dallmayr 
(1977) has critiqued this objectivity by referring to Dilthey's 
approach to understanding (verstehen) in the social sciences 
as too psychologistic. Dallmayr has written that: 
. . . understanding/interpretation to Dilthey was 
a self-transposition into the life of the author 
or agent which eliminated its practical relation 
to life in favor of a contemplative model of sci­
entific objectivity. (p. 28) 
Phenomenological studies in the social sciences have be­
come to some extent a continuation of Dilthey's efforts to 
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elucidate the dimension of "meaning" as a counterpart to 
scientific explanation. Even hermeneutic phenomenology, (as 
will be discussed further below), reflects much of Dilthey's 
interest in individual consciousness as a means for developing 
a theory of understanding. However, according to Dallmayr 
(197 7), Husserl extended the scope of inquiry beyond normative 
values, (the scientific interests in explanation), to the 
full range of phenomena (natural and cultural) "amenable to 
human cognition" (p. 9). Husserl wanted to unravel the 
"meaningful core, or 'essence', of phenomena as disclosed in 
a purified consciousness" (Dallmayr, 1977, p. 9). 
Unfortunately, the clarification of meaning and the do­
main of intersubjective understanding originally introduced 
by Dilthey v/ere lost in Husserl's explanation of conscious­
ness as the "transcendental limit of the world" (Dallmayr, 
1977, p. 12). Husserl later tried to overcome this over­
emphasis of individuation ("purified consciousness") by intro­
ducing the notion of the "life world" (Lebenswelt), or the 
world of mundane experience (McCarthey, 1973, p. 359). But 
he was not able to really clarify the relationship of the 
"life world" with individual consciousness. 
This development of the phenomenological tradition in 
Dilthey's and Husserl's (1965) work can be contrasted with 
the philosophical orientation of hermeneutical phenomenology 
which Gadamer has associated with through the thought of 
Martin Heidegger. Heidegger reshaped phenomenological 
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analysis in Being and Time (1962) with his "existential onto­
logy" or hermeneutical phenomenology. Hermeneuticists in­
fluenced by Heidegger, such as Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (19 65, 
1966), have tended to redefine interpretive exegesis by de-
emphasizing the aspect of subjective purpose and intentionality. 
In Truth and Method (1975) Gadamer presents history not so much 
as an emanation of individual practice but as a complex learn­
ing process in which "man is able to decipher himself only 
through encounters with past cultural traditions" (p. 292). 
In contrast with Gadamer's movement away from the strictly 
phenomenological tradition, yet with some relation to Heidegger's 
hermeneutic phenomenology, (especially his interest in the 
character of human being-in-the-world), is Paul Ricoeur's 
(1966) notion that hermeneutics is a listening, a "belief." 
While Ricoeur's "hermeneutics of belief" offers an ontologi-
cally descriptive affirmation and demystification of the 
"symbols," (as belief), his use of phenomenology as an in­
strument of hearing and of believing reflects a descriptive 
investigation of the field of symbolic language, (a recogni­
zably phenomenological technique closely related to the con­
temporary developments in ethnomethodology). Unlike Gadamer's 
(1975) claims for hermeneutics as an "understanding science," 
or ontology, Ricoeur's descriptive/phenomenological hermeneu­
tics, (conditioned by symbols), is oriented much more toward 
an interest in objective consciousness, or false consciousness, 
than toward being-ness. 
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Much of Ricoeur's work can be compared with Jurgen Habermas' 
(1971, 1977, 1979) theory of "distorted communications." Both 
aim to remove illusions and encourage a "hermeneutics of sus­
picion" (Ihde, 1974, p. 141). Habermas also seems to be­
lieve that there is a "hidden substratum which is the real 
hidden under a set of appearances" (Ihde, 1971, p. 85). For 
Ricoeur (1966) it is impossible that man may know himself 
directly or introspectively. Both Habermas and Ricoeur sug­
gest a "detour," or indirect route through either symbolic 
interpretations or, a? in Habermas' later suggestions, through 
Freudian psychoanalysis, to get to this hidden dimension of 
consciousness (Giddens, 1977, p. 62 ff). Psychoanalysis, as 
method, defines a set of rules for interpretation which re­
main the center of interest. Ricoeur (1966) implies agree­
ment with Habermas that Freud offers a useful hermeneutical 
method for displaying the "limits of phenomenological possi­
bility" (p. 4). For the development of hermeneutic pheno­
menology, Ricoeur has contributed a helpful distinction be­
tween the methodologies of description and explanation. He 
admits that the psychoanalytic experience "bears a much great­
er resemblance to historical understanding than to natural 
explanation" (Ihde, 1971, p. 134). 
Ricoeur approaches the application of phenomenology to 
language somewhat differently than Habermas1 (1979) theory 
of an ideal communicative competence in his "universal prag­
matics." Ricoeur justifies the need to turn to language, 
(as a symbol system), as a means of elaborating concepts 
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indirectly and dialectically rather than directly and uni-
vocally" (Ihde, 1971, p. 98). The hermeneutic turn in his 
phenomenology is seen in his interpretive interests in the 
need to understand symbolic expressions. And unlike earlier 
structural interests (in hermeneutics) in the restoration or 
reliving of experience, Ricoeur interprets the world of ex­
pressions as the object correlate which is used to reflect 
the subject, and subjectivity itself is reflected in the field 
of expressions. Consequently, this experience-expression link 
in Ricoeur's hermeneutics explains why he interprets the prob­
lem of the symbol to be the problem of language. He has 
written that: 
. . . in order to think in accord with symbols one 
must subject them to a dialectic; only then is it 
possible to set the dialectic within interpretation 
itself and come back to living speech. . . . This 
return to the immediate is not a return to silence, 
but rather to the spoken word, to the fullness of 
language. (Ihde, 1971, p. 163) 
Gadamer's Philosophical Distinction 
In many ways, Gadamer is in agreement with Ricoeur's turn 
to the language phenomena. Both use phenomenology, as a 
theory, for assuming the central value of the primacy of con­
crete experience—subjectivity as opposed to objectivity. 
Ricoeur's (1966) "eidetic" interest in meaning—his interest 
in describing experience as opposed to an objective explana­
tion—is also in line with Gadamer's (1975, p. 329) anti-
positivism. However, Ricoeur claims that experience is to 
be read through expression. The circle of belief (affirma­
tion) and understanding in Ricoeur's hermeneutics depends on 
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an underlying focus upon the use of expression as 'interpre­
tation. This is quite different from Gadamer's hermeneutical 
description of experience and understanding. To Gadamer, 
what interprets the phenomena, or what precedes the under­
standing of experience, is the experience itself. Experi­
ence to Gadamer is "more being than consciousness" (1975, p. 249). 
Consequently, the ontological significance of Gadamer's philo­
sophical claims suggests that since experience precedes the 
understanding of experiencing then subjective self-awareness 
arises secondarily. It should be recognized that Gadamer's 
appreciation of the language phenomenon, (Ricoeur's symbolic 
expression), is not for an approach to the eidetic structures 
of consciousness by a reflective procedure, but for its re­
flection of experience itself and a deeper understanding of 
being-ness. 
This discussion of Gadamer's (1975) and Ricoeur's (1966) 
work with Heidegger's (1962) existential analytic is very im­
portant for developing a relationship between the methodologi­
cal direction of hermeneutics and the use of such for under­
standing/interpreting educational experience in and with the 
curriculum. Although both Gadamer and Ricoeur have demon­
strated the transition from the psychological, (Husserl's 
(1965) individuation or subjectivity), to the hermeneutic 
foundation of the cultural sciences, Gadamer is more success­
ful in developing Heidegger's notion of Dasein, the human 
condition of being-in-the-world, for an ultimately ontological 
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understanding of intersubjectivity and the limits of self-
reflection. According to Heidegger, the basic attribute of 
man's existential condition, or Dasein, itself is the ground­
works for an understanding of meaning, i.e., the ontological 
task (Wolf, 1975, p. 103). Dasein was seen by Heidegger as 
enmeshed in a fabric of "preunderstandings"—a fabric that is 
basically intersubjective and cultural in character, and there­
fore experiential, and not itself a condition of symbolic ex­
pression as Ricoeur would lead us to believe. Gadamer (1975) 
also steps beyond Ricoeur's phenomenological method by empha­
sizing the significance of an openness to past and future in 
historicality and/or tradition in his ontology: "The problem of 
history is not how relationships are in general experiencable 
and knowable but how relationships that no one has experienced 
as such should be knowable" (p. 211). 
It might be helpful to suggest that the questions of 
methodology in philosophical hermeneutic concerns should be 
distinguished from the structural hermeneutic approach of the 
ethnomethodologists, especially Alfred Shutz (1973) who fol­
lows Husserl's (1965) phenomenology. Ricoeur's description 
of symbolic expression and the "suspicion of belief" is re­
lated to ethnomethodology's description of "understanding" 
as not simply an individual category denoting an existential 
or "experiential" form of "common-sense knowledge of human 
affairs" (Dallmayr, 1977, p. 10). Like Husserl, Shutz has 
left unresolved the measure of consciousness and intersubjec-
tivity. 
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Ricoeur's (1966) hermeneutics also has not transcended 
the phenomenological dependencies on conscious self-reflection 
and reality construction, (symbolic expressions), in order to 
establish an understanding of the historical conditionedness 
or situatedness for this consciousness. Even though Ricoeur 
and Gadamer agree that the dialectical experience is the 
"method" for surfacing the "truths" of intersubjectivity and 
man's existential condition, the perspective of "indirectness" 
and "suspicion" held by Ricoeur differs substantially from 
Gadamer*s prescription to an openness to emerging experience 
conditioned by historical and linguistic factors in under­
standing human being-ness. This distinction is not only due 
to the different lens of phenomenology and ontology, but also 
to the epistemological assumptions of each. 
Ricoeur views the epistemological task as entailing a 
search for disclosing the false consciousness inherent in 
symbolic structures of experience-expression. Gadamer's 
critique of the epistemological subject's role in historical 
understanding emphasizes that the subject is incapable of 
extricating himself from the very traditions which he attempts 
to study. Ricoeur's approach to a hermeneutic phenomenology 
appears to assume that it is possible and necessary to achieve 
a degree of objectivity from which the phenomenal world held 
in one's consciousness can be "analyzed" and "judged" for 
its symbolic nature. Not only is this objectivity rejected 
in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, but the concerns of 
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Gadamer are quite distinct from either epistemological or 
methodological ones. 
Unlike Hegel who also suggested that knowledge is ac­
quired through a self-objectification of consciousness, Gadamer 
(1975) asserts that experience has its dialectical fulfill­
ment not in a conscious knowing but in an "openness for ex­
perience, which is itself set in free play by experience" 
(p. 338). In the Hegelian tradition, however, Gadamer retains 
the "negative moment of the dialectic"—what he calls the 
"principle of dynamic change" (p. 339). This notion of the 
negativity inherent in the dialectical encounter is central 
to Gadamer's hermeneutics. According to Gadamer (1975), the 
task of hermeneutics is to find one's way through the give-
and-take of dialogue. In the dialogical experience, the struc­
ture of question and answer is presupposed. Thus, all experi­
ence reflects the structure of questioning because "every ex­
perience runs counter to expectation if it really deserves 
the name experience" (p. 339). Moreover, the realization that 
some matter is other than one had first thought, the insight 
of all "experience," presupposes the process of passing through 
questioning. 
Hermeneutics for Understanding Curriculum 
The method of questioning in the dialectical experience, 
of finding the right questions through an openness to emerging 
dialogue, and the existential "preunderstanding" of our inter-
subjective condition are components of Gadamer's theory which 
are especially significant to a hermeneutics of educational 
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experience. Each of these hermeneutic realities also helps 
to describe the circle of understanding implicit to our being-
in-the-curriculum. The problem of understanding the curricu­
lum itself is an affirmation that the curriculum is not what 
it was thought to be. In realizing the dialogical groundworks 
of intersubjectivity, we can begin to reflect upon the in­
evitable questioning or tension that exists in all encounters 
of intersubjectivity. The reflective mode initiates the phase 
of openness which is presupposed in the process of questioning 
and itself presupposes that the answers are unknown. In af­
firming this mutuality (of questioning) in intersubjectivity 
we can begin to understand the meaningfulness of the curriculum, 
i.e., its ontological significance. Moreover, based on Gadamer's 
(1975) explication of experiencing, any experience in the 
curriculum (as dialogue/intersubjectivity) can be considered 
a dialectical encounter. 
The reality of questioning inherent in the hermeneutic 
assumptions concerning the curriculum also acknowledges the 
negativity of the dialectical encounter. It is this negativi­
ty of knowing that we do not know which defines the hermeneu-
tical task in an educational framework. The problem of un­
derstanding the meaning of being-in-the-curriculum, of knowing 
that we do not know this meaning is, moreover, an affirmation 
that something, i.e., our relationships in the curriculum, is 
not what it was originally thought to be. Finding the right 
questions, then, becomes a particular challenge to the educa­
tional hermeneuticist. 
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The notion of openness to this not knowing, to this 
affirmation of the hermeneutic task of understanding, is also 
significant to our being-in-the-curriculum. Richard Palmer 
(1969) helps to illustrate the openness which Gadamer de­
scribes as implicit to all genuine understanding. He dis­
cusses the approach of Socrates as a model of the dialectical 
encounter in questioning. He states that: 
. . . in Socrates' vacillation between knowing and 
not knowing in the playful probing of the subject 
from different angles lies the willingness to risk 
everything and to be instructed by the subject 
matter itself. Beneath the artful shiftiness of 
Socrates is the serious intention to let the sub­
ject under discussion lead the way. (p. 234) 
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CHAPTER III 
THE GROUNDS FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN 
HERMENEUTICS AND CRITICAL THEORY 
The challenge of finding the right questions from which 
to begin the hermeneutical task of interpreting and under­
standing the intersubjective and dialectical experiences of 
teachers and students in the school context can be approached 
initially by reflecting upon the assumptions or preconceptions 
from which these questions must come. This reflexivity it­
self represents a dialectical tension that exists between the 
questioner and the tradition questioned, (even if it is the 
tradition of which the questioner is a part). The theoreti­
cal assumptions that determine questions concerning social or 
intersubjective relationships should be clarified before put­
ting to use a method of analysis, since the choices between 
theoretical approaches can significantly influence such pre­
conceptions of research. 
The self-reflective mode for formulating questions re­
garding tradition has been the method of inquiry assumed by 
both critical social theory and philosophical hermeneutics. 
This methodological similarity reflects only the basic epis-
temological agreement that has been shared by adherents to 
these different theoretical traditions. In general, the dis­
agreements concerning the value and purpose of self-reflection 
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mark the boundaries between the epistemological critique of 
ideology (of critical social theory) and the ontological in­
terest in a better understanding of the conditions for under­
standing itself (of philosophical hermeneutics). 
Questions relating to how and why we know certain things 
and how we interpret and come to an understanding of our re­
lationships within and amongst different traditions are all 
dependent on how we perceive the conditions of social and 
cultural interactions. Although critical theory and philo-
sopical hermeneutics both affirm the importance of the his­
torical and linguistic conditions for social knowledge and 
understanding, they seem to assess these conditions quite 
differently. And yet, due to recent developments in the cri­
tical theory of Habermas (1979), these assessments, or pre­
conceptions of interpretive value, have moved toward a syn­
thesis of interest in the universality of the language 
phenomenon that conditions both our knowing and our under­
standing. 
Discussion of the dialectical experience of teachers and 
students in and with the curriculum will benefit from a closer 
analysis of our use of language and our relationships in/with 
tradition that condition our interpersonal relationships. 
Moreover, the decision to apply the hermeneutic/interpretive 
perspective for analyzing such relationships can claim a 
stronger justification if the critical perspective is found 
to support characteristics of the hermeneutic experience. 
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My own preconceptions as researcher/hermeneuticist lead me to 
believe that a deeper meaning in intersubjective relationships 
can be understood through dialogue between these perspectives. 
It is apparent that the differences which have brought 
about debate between Habermas (1977) and Gadamer (1976) threat­
en to obstruct the possibility of formulating a fusion of 
their theoretical assumptions and claims which is relevant to 
the interests of both in communicative interaction. The in­
terest of Habermas's critical theory is the emancipation of 
the self from unnecessary domination in all of its forms, 
especially ideological claims to truth that reflect an objec­
tivity which distorts communicative interaction (Misgeld, 1976, 
p. 94). Gadamer's hermeneutic theory clarifies the difference 
between solving the practical problems of communicative inter­
action (e.g. , all those involving social norms) and recog­
nizing the legitimacy of those problems as a feature of his­
torical understanding and the tradition-context of language 
(communication) that may or may not reflect domination. Con­
sequently, the assumptions concerning the power of self-re­
flection to liberate or emancipate the self from the conditions 
of ideology depend on whether such conditions are considered 
as distorting communicative interaction and therefore illegi­
timate, or as legitimate prejudices of the tradition-context 
which they reflect. Nonetheless, I will attempt to follow the 
historical dialogue between these theorists. And, largely by 
reference to the work of Hoy (1978) , Misgeld (1976) , McCarthy 
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(1978), and Wolff (1975), I hope to show that both existing 
and potential agreement between Habermas and Gadamer can clari­
fy the relationship between critical reflection, self-knowledge 
and practical action. Moreover, this theoretical "fusion of 
horizons" can be considered helpful to any analysis of Self-
reflective experience as well as further study of intersub-
jectivity in particular contexts (e.g., schools). 
The Gadamer-Habermas Debate 
Habermas has included a discussion of hermeneutics in his 
critical survey of recent work in sociology and social theory 
entitled The Logic of the Social Sciences (1976). He has 
agreed with Gadamer's criticism of the unreflective character 
of positivistic theory of social science. On the other hand, 
Habermas has also suspected Gadamer's theory of tending 
toward relativism and of lacking a critical analysis of the 
ontological basis it derives from Heidegger. Habermas has 
considered the hermeneutical description of the sciences rele­
vant only to the socio-historical disciplines and subordinate 
to the even more reflective level of his own concern with 
"Ideologickritic"—social criticism of ideologies modeled on 
the paradigm of psychoanalysis. 
In his more recent work, Knowledge and Human Interests 
(1971), Habermas has suggested that science is ideological and 
that the scientific method of objectivity prevents the culti­
vation of individual autonomy and emancipatory truth. He 
instead has offered a "discipline of trained thought" that 
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aims to "outwit" its innate human interest (p. 311). The in­
terests that condition knowledge (deriving from work, language, 
and authority), have been of primary concern to Habermas. 
According to Macdonald's (1975) description, Habermas has set 
forth "the basic proposition that knowledge cannot be divorced 
from human interest" (p. 286). Habermas has proposed a self-
reflective science that transcends objectivism and encourages 
emancipation from the interests of control and domination. 
Wolff (1975) has explained that Habermas considers criti­
cal self-reflection a theoretical methodology which has eman­
cipatory power. Wolff has quoted Habermas's claims that: 
"the subject experiences in itself to the extent that it be­
comes transparent to itself in the history of its genesis" 
(1975, p. 36). This experiencing of self is definitely an 
epistemological mode of interest in methodology, in line with 
Habermas's sociological interpretation of science. 
In arguing that Gadamer's hermeneutics lacks a sufficient­
ly critical (self-reflective) attitude toward these episte­
mological concerns, Habermas has suggested that hermeneutical 
reflection should only be considered as a sort of pre-scien-
tific exercise of self-reflective activity by "controlled 
alienation" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 27). Gadamer's (1976) version 
of self-reflection, which will be discussed below, has been 
criticized even further by Habermas (1977) as tending toward 
subjectivism, as opposed to his (Habermas's) ir.ore pragmatic 
kind of objectivity in self reflection. 
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Gadamer (1976) , in turn, has criticized the objectivistic 
interests in Habermas's epistemology. He has suggested that 
sociological methodology itself creates an intentional aliena­
tion and distancing from the subject matter. In rebuttal to 
Habermas's (1977) critique, Gadamer (1976) has maintained that 
hermeneutical experience lies beyond science and is directed 
against alienation. Consequently, he has argued that Habermas 
doesn't really explain the truth of understanding in hermeneu­
tical reflection. Gadamer (1976) has stated that Habermas 
places too much value on a "dogmatic objectivism" that dis­
torts hermeneutic reflection (p. 28). While claiming that 
this objectivism discredits the necessary conditions for under­
standing, Gadamer has posited that in hermeneutic theory, 
subject-matter and method are intrinsically connected. As 
Wolff (1975) has explained, "sociology of knowledge (that is) 
grounded in hermeneutics will be seen to define both its own 
object and its method of grasping this object" (p. 102). 
Such a theory leads beyond method into its own philosophical 
conceptions of knowledge and of existence, an important 
difference from the epistemological perspective used by Habermas. 
In other words, according to Gadamer (1976), hermeneutic 
method should be seen as involving and involved in episte­
mology and ontology, the interest in the conditions of being 
itself in the process of understanding. 
Gadamer (1976) has subsequently criticized Habermas's 
premise that hermeneutics should serve the methodology of the 
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social sciences. He has stated that this assumption, in itself, 
is a prior decision of great significance: 
. . . for the purpose of sociological method as eman­
cipating one from tradition places it at the outset 
very far from the traditional purpose and starting 
point of the hermeneutical problematic with all its 
bridge building and recovery of the best in the past. 
(p. 26) 
Gadamer's hermeneutics has assumed a methodology that pre­
sents a discipline grounded in question and inquiry which, 
in developing an interest in historicity, guarantees the truth 
of interpretation (or understanding of relationships in his­
tory) . Rather than concluding that inevitable relativity makes 
the notion of truth irrelevant, he has argued that historicity 
guarantees the truth of the interpretation. This "truth," 
according to Gadamer, cannot be verified by the methodology 
of science. The hermeneutic method of Verstehen has as its 
task the discovery of truth not attainable by science (Wolff, 
1975, p. 104). 
The method of Gadamer's (1975, 1976) hermeneutics can 
best be referred to as the "hermeneutical circle" which is 
an acknowledgement of the researcher's or interpreter's need 
to recognize the inevitability of approaching material with 
certain prejudices (preconceptions)*, or anticipations, origi­
nating in his/her own historicity, and yet retain a certain 
openness to the object of study, (i.e., a receptiveness to 
the "otherness" of the material, allowing it to speak for it­
self, creating a balance between prejudice and openness). 
Gadamer has emphasized the point that the circle is ontological 
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rather than methodological. As Wolff (1975) has explained: 
The hermeneutical circle is not simply a heuris­
tic, methodological device-, invented to facilitate 
the approach to historico-cultural material; it 
is the reality of being of interpreter and inter­
preted, and their mediation and unity in the 
history of events. (p. 106) 
Gadamer (1975) has argued that prejudices (at least "legi­
timate" prejudices) are necessary conditions for understanding 
(p. 238 ff). He has condemned the rise of the discrediting of 
prejudice which has been brought about by objectivist theory 
in the social sciences. Gadamer has written: 
That which presents itself, under the aegis of an 
absolute self-construction by reason, as a limit­
ing prejudice belongs, in fact, to historical 
reality itself. What is necessary is a fundamental 
rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a 
recognition of the fact that there are legitimate 
prejudices, if we want to do justice to man's 
finite, historical mode of being. Thus we are 
able to formulate the central question of a truly 
historical hermeneutics, epistemologically its 
fundamental question, namely: where is the ground 
of the legitimacy of prejudices? (1975, pp. 245-
246) 
Gadamer has also offered a redefinition of "objectivity" 
which requires a certain "openness" to the subject matter and 
allows prejudices to be discovered: "Verstehen (understanding) 
of what is there consists in the working out of a . . . pro­
jection, which is certainly constantly revised by what results 
from further penetration into the meaning" (1975, p. 267). 
The "understanding" in philosophical hermeneutics is not 
abstracted from the hermeneutical situation. As Gadamer (1976) 
has stated, "hermeneutics teaches us to see through the dogmati 
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of asserting an opposition and separation between the ongoing, 
natural 'tradition' and the reflective appropriation of it" 
(p. 34). This is a central point of distinction between 
Gadamer's ontological perspective and Habermas's strictly 
epistemological lens. Unlike the self-reflective objectivity 
established in Habermas's epistemological frame of reference, 
Gadamer (1975) has emphasized the interpreter's/researcher's 
consciousness of his/her own historico-cultural context as 
establishing an ontological significance to knowledge and 
understanding. Moreover, Habermas's (1977) criticism of 
hermeneutic's alienated subjectivity should be qualified by 
Gadamer's (1975) clarification of such a contextualism. In 
contrast to a subjectivistic kind cf relativism, in Gadamer's 
contextualism the interpretation or understanding is dependent 
upon, or relative to, the circumstances (historicity) in 
which it occurs. 
For this contextualism, rational reflection and dispute 
do not stop with the interpreter's personal preferences. 
Justifying reasons for the appropriateness of a context rather 
than alternative ones can and should be given. Furthermore, 
since no context is absolute, different interpretations are 
possible. Hoy (1978) has claimed that any hermeneutic theory 
should account for the possibility of adjudicating between 
conflicting interpretive understandings (p. 4). Gadamer's 
contextualism offers justifying reasons for interpretations. 
Since interpretive understanding is conditioned by preunder-
standings arising out of the situation of the interpreter, 
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the interpreter can defend his understanding"by making these 
preunderstandings conscious. This assertion of the conditional 
character (the situatedness) of all understanding, is itself 
conditional according to Gadamer: 
Even when we ourselves as historically enlightened 
thinkers, are fundamentally clear about the his­
torical conditionedness of human thinking and 
hence about our own conditionedness, we have not 
ourselves taken an unconditioned stand. . . . The 
consciousness of the conditionedness does not in 
any way negate this conditionedness. (Hoy, 1978, 
p. 70) 
In his insistence that hermeneutic theory is philosophy 
and not a particular science, Gadamer (1976) has emphasized 
that hermeneutics cannot supply material appropriateness con­
ditions for interpretive contexts, that it "cannot legislate 
a canon of interpretive norms of a 'method' of criticism" 
(p. 31). However, Gadamer has suggested that philosophical 
questions or inquiries can begin to approach how we can be 
said to have certain knowledge—about how utterances can be 
said to be meaningful, and it is these ontological queries 
which call for a "practical language" that makes explicit the 
preunderstandings involved in discourse. 
Gadamer's view is that language and world share the same 
boundaries—both are historical in their appearance. Gadamer 
(1976) has claimed that: 
. . . there is no social reality with all its real 
coercions that for its part does not get repre­
sented again in a linguistically articulated con­
sciousness. Reality does not happen 'behind the back 
of language', but rather behind the back of the per­
son who lives with the subjective belief that he 
understands the world (or no longer understands it). 
Reality also happens in language. (p. 35) 
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The world is not an independent object for language; rather, 
the world presents itself in language (Wolff, 1975, p. 114). 
The Linguistic Condition 
The dialectical relationship of language and being (via 
the mediation of tradition and interpretation/understanding) 
gives Gadamer's hermeneutics, based as it is in linguistic 
foundations (i.e., the conditionedness of being) an ontological 
aspect. For just as language-understanding involves a certain 
grasp of being, so this same grasp of being underlies her­
meneutics. This is why Gadamer has spoken of "language as the 
horizon of a hermeneutic ontology" and what he means in the 
statement that "being that can be understood is language" 
(1976, p. 31). 
At the time of his initial critique of Gadamer's hermen­
eutics, Habermas (1977) had suggested that there was a need 
for a linguistically oriented qpproach to understanding the 
subject matter of the social sciences. However, he had typi­
cally viewed language as merely one aspect of reality and 
other constitutive factors exist, specifically work and power, 
in which language is grounded. He had claimed that the univer­
sality of the language phenomena as claimed by hermeneutics 
was an "idealism of linguisticality" and reflected a "sorry 
powerlessness" in the view of work and power relation's im­
pact on the social whole (Hoy, 1978, p. 124). Consequently, 
with its insistence on the communication (linguistic) basis 
for confronting disrupted (intersubjective) understanding, 
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and not through a systematic participation or method of learn­
ing specified rules (rational principles) of action which di­
rect communication, Habermas had criticized Gadamer's hermeneu­
tics for lacking a sufficiently critical attitude toward the 
authority of the tradition. 
In rebuttal, Gadamer (1976) pointed out that Habermas's 
critique of ideology was in itself a linguistic act of reflec­
tion. Gadamer maintained that faith in the power of reflection 
alone "represents an idealization that falsely attempts to 
break out of the hermeneutical circle" (p. 32). Furthermore, 
Gadamer asserted that Habermas's (1977) application of her­
meneutics with a "limiting concept of perfect interaction be­
tween understood motives and consciously performed action" 
was a misinterpretation of the true value of hermeneutics 
(1976, p. 33). Gadamer (1976) claimed the inclusion 
of work and power relations within his theory of hermeneutics: 
From the hermeneutical standpoint, rightly under­
stood, it is absolutely absurd to regard the con­
crete function of work and politics as outside 
the scope of hermeneutics. . . . The principle of 
hermeneutics simply means that we should try to 
understand everything that can be understood. (p. 33) 
Gadamer has maintained that the hermeneutical problem of 
understanding is universal and basic for all interhuman ex­
perience, "precisely because meaning can be experienced even 
where it is not actually intended" (p. 37). 
Van Manen (1977) has suggested that Gadamer believes her­
meneutics is practical, corrective, and emancipatory in the 
sense that it gains insights which make personal and social 
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change possible (p. 9). Gadamer has discussed this pragmatic 
emphasis of hermeneutics in his broad theoretical claims found 
in Truth and Method (1975). However, he has differentiated 
this pragmatism from a dogmatism that idealizes emancipation 
as a "completed reflection," both "empty and undialectical" 
(1976, p. 31). 
In continuing to criticize the idealism in Habermas's 
critical theory, Gadamer (1976) has claimed that Habermas's 
Marxist critique of ideology appears to presuppose that all 
understanding allows us to see through pretexts or "unmask 
false pretentions" (p. 32). As stated before, Gadamer has 
argued that this use of hermeneutics to "shake the dogmatism 
of life-praxis" is itself a dogmatic prejudice and an idea­
listic misinterpretation of hermeneutic reflection (p. 32). 
To Gadamer, reflection does not always step towards dissolv­
ing prior convictions. 
Gadamer himself has not been so interested in proving 
the illegitimacy of authority (such as the ordering of educa­
tion or the mandatory commands of the army and government) 
as he has been interested in our acceptance ot acknowledgement 
of relationships to authority. As he has said, authority "lives 
not from dogmatic power but from dogmatic acceptance" (1976, 
p. 36). Hermeneutical reflection then is not intended to 
dissolve our relationship or emancipate us from authority, 
but a means of becoming conscious of it. 
This seemingly unsolvable conflict of "idealizations" 
has been further discussed by Hoy in The Critical Circle (1978). 
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Hoy has stated that an unavoidable question implicit to Habermas's 
critical theory is whether hermeneutics is subject to ideology 
criticism or whether the latter is itself accounted for by 
the hermeneutical theory of understanding (p. 6). In insist­
ing that only a self-reflective understanding can accomplish 
practical liberation from unnecessary social controls, Habermas 
(1977) has suggested that hermeneutics serves ideology criti­
cism. Habermas also has continued to hold to a notion of rea­
son demanding principles of understanding and truth. 
Hoy has also posed a question relevant to Gadamer's (1976) 
claims. He has asked: 
Is it possible for philosophy itself to stay within 
the hermeneutical circle of understanding, and with­
in the limitations imposed by its own historical con­
ditions, yet legitimately posit rational principles 
as conditions for the possible validity of truth of 
particular acts of understanding? (1978, p. 118) 
Gadamer has maintained that there is no unconditioned stand­
point, not even for philosophical hermeneutics. Even as there 
is no way to see language from a nonlinguistic viewpoint, 
there is no way man can get out of history to view history 
as a whole. Moreover, Gadamer (1975) has noted that: 
. . . tradition exists only in constant alteration. 
To gain a connection with the tradition is a for­
mulation intended to call attention to an experi­
ence whereby our plans and wishes are always in 
advance of reality, and are, so to speak, even 
without connection with reality. What then be­
comes important is to mediate between desirable 
anticipations and practicable possibilities, be­
tween sheer wishes and actual intentions—that 
is, to imagine the anticipations in the substance 
of reality. (p. 250) 
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Theoretical Synthesis in Linguisticality 
Though it appears that it is at this juncture that Gadamer 
and Habermas seem to be most in disagreement, it has become 
evident since Habermas's (1979) later work in linguistics 
that the development of critical theory and hermeneutical re­
flection could be converging. Habermas has begun to provide 
his own approach to a linguistic theory for the social sci­
ences. In Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979 ) , 
he has developed a theory of communication that is far more 
detailed than Gadamer's account of linguisticality and pro­
vides a reversal of his earlier position concerning the idea­
lism of linguisticality. 
Habermas's awareness of the language phenomenon as con­
ditioning historical remembrance has been an importantly 
synthesizing characteristic. Misgeld (1976) has suggested 
that Habermas has become interested in Gadamer's insights be­
cause he has noticed that hermeneutical reflection on his­
torical understanding has "faithfully described the origin 
of understanding in the practice of communication" (p. 180). 
Giddens (1976) has investigated the Habermas-Gadamer 
dialogue relating to language and he has found Habermas agree­
ing with Gadamer that language is not merely a system of de­
scription. Habermas has stated that "language is the medium 
whereby an intersubjectively formed social life is carried 
on: Language is a medium of doing things through communica­
tion with others" (Giddens, 1977, p. 43). 
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Like Gadamer, Habermas (1979) has claimed universal sta­
tus for his theory of linguistics which he calls "universal 
pragmatics." And yet, in his "pragmatics," he has posited 
a transcendental and apparently unhistorical notion of truth 
that applies in all rational dialogues or discourse situations. 
(Gadamer has strongly resisted this unhistorical notion of 
rationality, and has insisted that there is nothing paradoxi­
cal about his own thesis of the historical character of all 
understanding.) 
Habermas's interest in expressing circumstances of "dis­
torted communication" in his linguistic theory, also has a 
particularly dogmatic prejudice. The emancipatory function 
in the notion of "communicative competence" is itself too 
subjective and too methodological. It forgets the purpose 
of intersubjectivity which is necessary for unveiling know­
ledge-orienting interests. Habermas's (1979) use of the 
notion of "communicative competence" to suggest an ideali­
zation of linguistic interaction is, consequently, different 
from Gadamer's emphasis on the mediating significance of 
language for bridging the hermeneutical gap between the pre­
sent experience of the self and traditional or historical 
situatedness. 
McCarthy (1978) has explained that Habermas stresses 
the limitations of an approach, e.g., Gadamer's hermeneutics, 
based solely upon the normal competence of a speaker of a 
natural language to understand symbolically structured ob­
jects and events (p. 191). The universalizing—by way of 
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ontologizing—of hermeneutics results in an "aprioristic de­
valuation of methods of social analysis with a theoretical 
basis that goes beyond normal linguistic experience" (p. 191). 
Habermas has in mind a theory of natural language that attempts 
to reconstruct linguistic competence. According to McCarthy, 
the question is whether Gadamer's insights, viewed methodologi­
cally and not ontologically, are actually compatible with such 
an approach. 
If the methodological issues are overlooked, it 
might appear that the different emphases of Gadamer 
and Habermas—on historicity, participation, and dia­
logue with the past versus enlightenment, critical dis^ 
tance, and anticipation of the future—spring only 
from their different attitudes toward tradition. 
Whereas Gadamer speaks of tradition primarily as a 
source of insights and values that have to be con­
stantly reactualized in every new situation, Habermas 
stresses the elements of domination, repression, and 
distortion, which are also incorporated in our heri­
tage and from which we must continually strive to 
emancipate ourselves. Whereas Gadamer speaks of 
'the dialogue that we are', Habermas speaks of the 
dialogue that is not yet but ought to be. Whereas 
Gadamer is moved by respect for the superiority of 
tradition, Habermas is motivated by the anticipation 
of a future state of freedom. . . there is no need 
to remain at this kind of impasse. Hermeneutic 
understanding can be pursued critically, with an 
interest in enlightenment and emancipation. And 
critique would remain empty without concrete input 
from our cultural heritage. (1976, p. 191) 
The Universality of Hermeneutic Understanding 
Anthony Giddens (1977) has also pointed out Habermas ' s over­
emphasis of the Verstehen-Erklaren (understanding-explanation) 
opposition in his theory. Giddens has explained that Habermas 
has failed to acknowledge the sense in which hermeneutics, 
insofar as it is concerned with all "meaningful comprehension," 
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must be as basic to a critique of ideology as to any other 
human enterprise (p. 54). Consequently, Habermas's ideals of 
emancipation and communicative competence should not be con­
sidered independent processes from autonomy of action and 
mutual understanding. Habermas's avoidance in including the 
level of ontology in his critical and linguistic theories has 
created this weakness in his ability to relate conditions of 
action and the capability of really tranforming those condi­
tions. Gadamer has consistently refused to separate or to 
suggest a heirarchy of importance amorjgst interests in action, 
mutual understanding, as well as communicative competence. 
Giddens (1977) has acknowledged that the universality of 
hermeneutical experience and the interconnectedness of sub­
ject matter and method in hermeneutical theory, forbids con­
fining hermeneutic problems in understanding and communica­
tion to one class of disciplines. He has based his criticism 
of Habermas's epistemology on the tendency of Habermas to be 
too accepting of a "deductive-nomological version of scien­
tific explanation" as a method for the social sciences (p. 52) . 
Giddens has explained that a nomological form of explanation, 
(which is essentially an empirical perspective modeled after 
the natural sciences and should be considered quite different­
ly from the interpretive prespective), should not be the only 
way of describing scientific interests, for "explanation in 
science is most appropriately characterized as the clarifi­
cation of queries, not deduction from causal laws, which is 
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only one sub-type of explanatory procedure" (p. 52). Conse­
quently, the hermeneutic/interpretive character of science 
must also be recognized, and meaningful understanding should 
be considered more integral to science than Habermas allows. 
Misgeld (1976) has mentioned a number of ways in which 
Gadamer's hermeneutics can become relevant to Habermas"s re­
design of a foundation for critical theory (pp. 168-171). 
Among these, Misgeld has claimed that philosophical hermeneu­
tics helps to clarify critical theory's epistemological status 
by describing the role of interpretive understanding in social 
practice. Hermeneutics takes historical understanding to 
be a practice of life and describes the practice of life as 
the practice of speech which articulates our historical exis­
tence in communicative interaction. Also, as with the impli­
cit aims of critical theory, Gadamer's hermeneutics has pro­
vided a notion of an ideal form of life in which "we have 
come to an understanding with one another which need no long­
er be revoked" (Misgeld, p. 170). Furthermore, according to 
Misgeld, critical theory must be seen as dependent upon a 
hermeneuticalielement: 
. , . the impossibility of securing intersubjective 
understanding before we have entered into a situ­
ated discourse with others about the specific mat­
ters at hand in this very situation. (p. 182) 
The dialogue or the reality of the relationship between 
Habermas's interest in a methodological application of expla­
nation (his epistemology) and hermeneutics in the service 
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of his critical theory and Gadamer's insistence that such an 
application distorts the character of the innate linguistic, 
historical and intersubjective conditions for meaningful un­
derstanding (in his hermeneutics) is valuable to most fields 
of the humanities, including education, which involve an 
essentially historical and ideological dimension. By exchang­
ing the terminology of their different perspectives, the 
methodological questions raised in hermeneutics, (i.e., the 
dialectic between the researcher and the researched), can be 
described as probing into the very possibility of thinking 
historically, and the ontological questions implicit to 
critical theory can be described as probing into the possibility 
of emancipation from historical controls, (i.e., the conditions 
of labor and suppressive authority), through self-reflection. 
In Hoy's (1978) assessment: 
. . . whether history is viewed as continuous or as 
discontinuous, (involving radical ruptures or para­
digm shifts), will make a difference to the kinds 
of explanations a discipline gives and to the extent 
to which it searches for causes and general princi­
ples. (p. 7) 
Habermas's (1977) epistemology distinguishes the circular 
character of knowledge as always located in history (there­
fore continuous as tradition or "paradigm"), and consequently 
is a defense of the hermeneutic significance to all knowledge-
constituted interests. Therefore, Habermas should acknowledge 
the rational (or "practical") ontology inherent in Gadamer's 
hermeneutics for uncovering the universal conditions and 
meaning of not only the socio-historical tradition, but 
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phenomena in other areas of the social sciences. While Gadamer's 
(1976) theory has maintained that interpretive understanding 
is different, not better, and thus recognizes the possibility 
of discontinuity between the researcher and what he/she re­
searches, it also makes a central principle of the fact that 
the researcher stands in and is conditioned by a tradition. 
Hoy has justifiably asked: 
Is it paradoxical to insist both on the possibility 
of historical discontinuity and on the necessary 
continuity of the interpreter (researcher) with his 
own historical tradition? (1978, p. 7) 
Gadamer has avoided answering such queries simply because his 
central principle suggests an openness and possibility that 
any relationship is conditioned by a tradition. The object 
of study of any discipline is just as much a product of the 
researcher's "tradition," no matter to what degree this re­
presents the cultural tradition, as it is of its own historical 
character. 
It should be clear that by challenging the social sciences 
to think not only about the historical character of their 
object of study but also the historical character of their 
own discipline, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics makes 
a better self-understanding in these disciplines an essential 
precondition for the legitimacy of their enterprise. Further­
more, this function of philosophical hermeneutics should 
be regarded by the critical theorists as a welcomed onto-
logical accompaniment to their own epistemological interests, 
in that "the task of identifying and reconstructing universal 
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conditions of possible understanding" (p. 1)—Habermas's (1976) 
own description of his "universal pragmatics"—serves both to 
acknowledge the conditions of historicity and linguisticality 
as well as to open a path toward emancipation from the con­
trolling agents which attempt to abuse our being in such 
conditions. 
The level of epistemology alone is not sufficient for 
developing a theoretical approach for interpreting human in­
teraction in the context of schools. The Erklaren route of 
practical objectivity itself is an illusion. Knowledge and 
human interests can neither be separated from each other nor 
from the ontological conditions out of which they are formed. 
My relationship as researcher (and interpreter) to the 
tradition of interaction between critical theory and hermeneu-
tics has been informed by the experience of self-reflection 
that has encouraged a projection of meaning concerning this 
interaction. Furthermore, this hermeneutic endeavor of reach­
ing a greater understanding of the subject matter can be 
illustrated by attempting to unveil the illusory mask of 
objectivity and describing my personal experience in the tra­
dition which conditions all of my understanding. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AFFIRMATION OF HISTORICALLY 
Habermas's (1979) theories of communication and social 
evolution have recognized the historicity of human existence 
and communication as a universal medium of social life, both 
aspects of Gadamer's (1975, 1976) philosophical hermeneutics. 
However, Habermas has attempted to mitigate the radically 
situational character of understanding through the introduc­
tion of theoretical elements, i.e., idealizations, which have 
been meant to reduce the context-dependency of the basic cate­
gories and assumptions of critical theory. Consequently, 
Habermas has continued to argue against Gadamer's approach 
to tradition which denies the possibility of methodologically 
transcending the hermeneutic point of view—that the linguis-
ticality and historicity of human existence are the very con­
ditions of possibility of understanding. O'Neill (1976) has 
explained that even in Habermas's linguistic turn, the in­
terpretive endeavor in the genesis of critical theory has 
not been represented clearly. For Habermas has limited the 
possibilities of the role of historical remembrance (reflec­
tion) by his emphasis on the normative function of rational 
discourse. 
In Gadamer's (1975) thought, the role of the historian 
or the sociologist in being conscious of and in conceptualizing 
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tradition has been described as the "effective historical con­
sciousness." Wolf (1975) has explained what is meant by the 
insistence that understanding is "effect-historical": 
The interpreter must recognize both his subject's 
and his own place in history, in the fusion of the 
two standpoints in his work ... it goes beyond 
a pure phenomenology of inter-personal or cross-
cultural understanding, existential or otherwise, 
for it allows the mind to see itself in a context, 
rather than bracketing off any world or context 
perceived other than through the mind . . . her-
meneutic philosophy forces the interpreter to be­
gin by grasping the place of his own consciousness 
in its historico-cultural context. (p. 107) 
In that this ongoing (dissertation) study implicitly 
represents my own research-oriented role as interpreter, it 
seems fitting that I affirm my effective-historical con­
sciousness by attempting to reflect upon those prejudices or 
preconceptions which have conditioned my relationship with 
the topic. The claim of participation, as hermeneuticist in 
the study, requires that I acknowledge the self-awareness 
derived from this self-reflection and that I project a new 
sense of meaning into the study as a consequence of this 
better self-understanding. 
According to McCarthy (1976), "the interpretive under­
standing of one's own tradition started with a 'structure of 
prejudices' . . . which have themselves been shaped by this 
tradition" (p. 175). Although this study has not been spe­
cifically intended to illustrate my efforts to understand 
the tradition of educational research (of which I have chosen 
to take part), the subject matter of my choice of research 
reflects, in an emergingly meaningful way, my participation 
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in or relationship with the tradition. Thus, in order to bet­
ter understand the tradition's influence upon this choice, 
as well as the affect that I have had upon the tradition, 
(through my participation and active making-sense of the 
research tradition), it is necessary that I reflect upon this 
relationship. 
The Circular and Dialectical Experience 
of Understanding 
Palmer (1969) has explicated Gadamer's dialectical her-
meneutics as a means to understanding that is "not manipu­
lation and control but participation and openness, not know­
ledge but experience, not methodology but dialectic" (p. 215). 
For Gadamer, the circular character of understanding the parts 
in terms of a projected sense of the whole, and revising the 
latter in the light of a closer investigation of the parts, 
is demonstrated in the experience of inquiry (interpretation) 
that is both a questioning from the context of one's pre-
understandings and an openness to new understandings. Such 
an openness cannot be a matter of the interpreter's ridding 
himself of all preconceptions and prejudgments. As McCarthy 
(1976) has noted, "there is, of course, no possibility of 
raising to consciousness all-at-once and once-and-for-all 
one's preconceptions and prejudgments" (p. 173). Consequently, 
the circular and dialectical experience of understanding con­
sists, in part, of an openness to the horizon of experience 
of the interpreter as it is brought to bear upon the horizon 
75 
of the tradition being interpreted. And, moreover, the self-
reflective turn that raises to consciousness this experience 
of the interpreter is itself only a partial understanding of 
the whole of the interpreter's experience that makes up this 
horizon. 
I have already attempted to relate that part of the dia­
lectical relationship with the tradition of interpretive and 
critical theory which has informed my present understanding 
of these theories. The projection of meaning that repre­
sents my understanding of these theories has been represented 
in previous chapters, especially Chapter III. I will not 
attempt to gain a better self-understanding by reflecting 
upon those preconceptions and experiences which represent the 
horizons of an interpretive understanding of this subject 
matter. Although this, too, is a part of the whole rela­
tionship with the subject of hermeneutics and educational 
experience, my projections of meaning regarding my partici­
pation in the tradition of formal education is the part 
of the circle that will be linguistically related. 
What follows represents a linguistic expression of a 
partial understanding gained through self-reflection. It is 
that part of the dialectical relationship with the tradition 
of interpretive theory which will provide a means of my 
capturing a sense of hermeneutics so that I may later articu­
late it in a framework that is meaningful to other relation­
ships more specific to the context of the school. Furthermore, 
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it is an interpretation of experiences that I have had in the 
tradition of formal education. It represents the historicity 
of those preconceptions which, at this time, is unavoid-
ably partial, incomplete and full of emerging meaning—meaning 
which may later enrich my participation. 
For the purposes of illustrating the process of hermeneu­
tic reflection, I have only been able to relate a broad, yet 
significant, spectrum of experiences that, at the time of 
actively sitting, reflecting and writing, I was able to be­
gin understanding as experiences in the tradition of educa­
tion which have conditioned my journey toward a study of 
intersubjective relationships in schools and the hermeneutic 
task of understanding those relationships 
The Reflective Turn of Understanding 
A very important link in my effective historical experi­
ence was the decision to pursue an undergraduate degree in 
political science. I can recall the difficulty in this de­
cision. At the time, I was not ready to begin limiting 
options for the future and I was definitely unprepared to 
choose a program of studies that was limited in itself to 
certain narrowly directed areas of study. In other words, I 
felt that I needed more time and one way to insure this was 
to enter a line of study that appeared to continue offering 
less well-defined opportunities for the future. This, I was 
soon to learn, was an accurate estimation of the uncertain 
options in such a liberal arts degree. As I look back now 
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with'an even stronger desire to remain flexible in terms of 
career orientation, I feel that my preconceptions of such 
flexibility were influenced by the tradition-context of the 
questions that many college students felt concerning the 
social and diplomatic direction of our country during the 
period from 1969-1972, when I was in college. 
The fact that throughout my political science education 
I inherited a very passive orientation to social institu­
tions, one which seemed to unquestionably value the status-
quo of institutionalized and bureaucratized authority, is 
significant. Moreover, the conservatism of judging revolu­
tionary motivations and insurgent activities in past and 
contemporary history as threatening to the valued stability 
and maintenance of social organization and democratic order 
should also be reflected upon as establishing an understanding 
of politics and social action which initially informed my 
judgments concerning the methods of the "left" for question­
ing the foundations of the "rightful" decision-makers. 
A second step in my effective education was the con-
cretization of the political science degree in my experience 
as an agent in the real world: my first job in government 
as a counselor in a large and archaic prison system. The 
history of my search for this position must credit my earlier 
sophomoric projections concerning the possible meanings and 
direction of the degree in political science. Although I 
had participated in a field program in state government, the 
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fact that I ran across a job as a "behavior analyst" in a 
federally operated prison counseling program hopefully should 
not reflect the academy's intentions for awarding degrees in 
political science. Again, this step into the tradition of 
school-work relationships reflects the possibilities of my 
own preunderstanding having influenced this relationship. 
The reality of being required to participate in ques­
tionable "corrections" practices or be fired must be considered 
as the beginning of a crisis, a turning point, in my passi-
vistic perspective. Having entered this field at a time when 
young, naive and innocent people were incarcerated for lengthy 
periods of time because of the possession and use of marijuana, 
the drug which to this day the policing network has been 
unable to discourage from even the most respectable citi­
zens, forced a perspective which required questioning the 
status quo and authority. Other experiences which I shared 
with many college graduates at this time—Vietnam and Water­
gate especially—certainly helped to encourage a change to a 
perspective (world view) of pessimism and disgust concerning 
the "establishment"—the prison system, the military, the 
government and those who had supposedly assisted me in pre­
paring for the initiation into the work-a-day world. 
I soon found myself incapable of continuing the promotion 
of certain prison practices and searched for a way out, 
finding it through friendship gained with those outsiders 
who visited the cell blocks and seemed to be more successful 
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in affirming the basic humanity of the inmates. Those who 
were most willing to discuss their interests with me were 
seminary students from a local university who chose fieldwork 
in the prisons. The subtle, yet effective, methods of ex­
cusing groups of inmates from meaningless labor and the efforts 
performed in establishing an educational program, a learning 
laboratory and high school equivalency lessons, proved to me 
the success of an "anti-establishment" perspective which had 
liberating and constructive results. These achievements im­
pressed me especially because they were undertaken without 
the trappings of religious dogma that, I feel, would have sti­
fled the individual's choice of commitment. I subsequently 
decided to explore this religious perspective on corrections 
and entered a seminary program which permitted a concentra­
tion in corrections solutions. 
The selection of a seminary program, again, was primarily 
determined by my speculative (prejudiced) interests in less 
structure. The thought of exploring not only a theological 
perspective on the conditions of our interpersonal relation­
ships, but actually experiencing broader opportunities for 
such relationships, informed the selection of location for 
this educational venture. The transition to a much more re­
ceptive environment, (an interdenominational seminary, located 
in a seemingly multi-cultural city—Boston), to intellectualism 
and other "anti-establishment" concerns, provided the ground­
works of what has become my personal orientation to inquiry, 
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openness, interpersonal relationships (intersubjectivity), and 
interpretive understanding as a means for research. The exe-
getical activities of practicing Biblical interpretations 
touched an existing interest in our dependency on understand­
ing and language use. 
The consistent experiences in the "heavy" academic area 
demonstrated the potential of dialogue and dialectical tension 
as a pedagogical method for smoking out theological truths 
concerning the metaphysical world. This helped to establish 
a repertoire of interpretive techniques for creating tension 
in order to encourage more lively, challenging and meaningful 
interaction. And certainly the plethora of directed readings 
in theology and ethics (my graduate concentration), which 
established the need for an acceptance of a pluralistic world 
and for a way to find some sense-making, universalizable 
perspective relating East and West, subject and object, im­
manence and transcendence, secular and sacred, I and Thou, 
etc., directed me towards more alternative approaches to "re­
ality and truth." 
The decision to continue to pursue pedagogy in the for­
mal robes as teacher was made as yet another option for 
maintaining some autonomy of choice and expression. In that 
I had been instructed to believe that the teacher is respon­
sible for interpreting the direction of the curriculum and 
the pedagogical tradition of which he/she becomes a part, I 
felt that such a role would allow me to influence this tradition 
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and better understand the means by which students could be 
liberated from unnecessary inhibitions in school relationships, 
e.g., the manipulative structures of objectivity in testing 
and evaluating procedures. 
While being initiated into the tradition of the school, 
I also decided to search further for a better understanding 
of traditions in education and how I could philosophically 
begin to fit, as I had soon discovered an inevitable necessi­
ty for insuring survival in the predominant "systems" approach 
to education. The decision to complete a degree program in 
education represents an openness to identifying with some 
emerging traditions in educational theory which promised to 
enlighten my journey toward an understanding of human inter-
subjectivity. The domains of moral education and curriculum 
criticism seemed most promising. 
At this time, I was fortunate to begin a period of inter­
action with the personalities who have affirmed and promoted 
my own intellectual interests—especially those immediate to 
this dissertation's purpose, my doctoral committee. I cannot 
complete any conscious self-reflective efforts without em­
phasizing the open, yet guided, facilitation for this research 
provided by these individuals. Moreover, the perspective 
which I maintain as researcher has built-in preunderstandings 
which have been partially informed by my interactions ("fusion 
of horizons") with these individuals. The committee chairman 
has included the very important point that what I choose to 
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read as researcher will very much influence the manner in which 
I write and participate in research. This seemingly obvious 
point, yet insignificant in an objective sense, is of upmost 
importance to one who is interested in the hermeneutic task. 
Other committee responses to this inquiry have provided 
the incentive to approach the research with a degree of re­
sponsibility to the subject matter that allows it to become 
both content and form of the research—and the comcomittant 
incentive to challenge the methodological expectations of 
"research" in order to build upon current work in the field, 
(especially in qualitative evaluation and curriculum criticism). 
Most important, however, is the introduction to the thoughts 
shared by the critical sociologists and educational theorists 
who these educators have developed some association with. Such 
an introduction encouraged me two years ago to write a pre­
liminary proposal for research that spoke to the need for 
associating religious reflection with the existential concerns 
about the educational experience. This paper, entitled "The 
Developmental Criteria of Dialogue," introduced the notion 
of "co-existential relationships" as a qualitative charac­
teristic for assessing the intersubjectivity inherent in 
dialogue and for developing a concern for meaning and truth 
in the educational process. It is with this topic that I 
also first introduced the ontological dimension in educational 
experience and suggested that inquiry, (as a search for under­
standing, i.e., the hermeneutical task), is that act of 
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reflection which finds its origination in the atmosphere of 
emitted, or developed, dialogue—dialogue that has been sent 
forth from the center of our co-existence. Inquiry, there­
fore, is grounded in the possibilities of dialogue. 
As I reflect now upon the subject matter of that paper, 
I begin to recognize that at that time I was still very much 
"stuck" (prejudiced) with an approach to ontology which as­
sumed a very objective point of view. The notion that there 
exists "patterns of dialogue" which can be systematically 
described and researched, depended on a structured, phenome-
nological lens of study which inhibted an openness to experi­
ence—the preconception that I have maintained as an essential 
characteristic of ontology. Nonetheless, this early formula­
tion of an interpretive interest in intersubjectivity must be 
considered now as an important "variable" that has informed 
my pre-understandings of the subject matter at hand. 
Perhaps the most significant point that I reflect upon 
now in an effort to disclose the foreknowledge that presently 
influences, as does any tradition, my choice of interest is 
related to the importance of my selection of readings. These 
readings have created an attraction to metaphors, models, and 
paradigms concerning dialogue, intersubjectivity, and dia­
lectical tension. The experience of passing over to another's 
tradition (or worldview) and coming back to one's own cul­
tural orientation, having shared "truths" and gained insights, 
is the metaphorical language that John Dunne uses in describing 
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the interaction necessary to understand one's own (religious) 
tradition as well as the "truths" shared by different tradi­
tions. Dunne's The Way of All the Earth (1972) is a model of a 
hermeneutical venture of one who listens to, (is open to), the 
stranger (the "other" by journeying away from his own frame 
of reference to the world, and, in returning, not only dis­
covers new insights about others' points of view, but can 
reflect upon his own tradition with new lens for discovering 
and understanding deeper truths in that world (tradition). 
I have also been attracted to the writings of Heinrich 
Zimmer (1946) and Mircea Eliade (1959) who have attempted to 
describe many of the universalizable characteristics found in 
different religious world views. Zimmer (pp. 219-221) told 
the story of Rabbi Eisek, son of Jekel, of Crakow who experi­
ences a number of dreams tempting him to travel to the city 
of Prague where he should discover a hidden treasure. Rabbi 
Eisek decides to follow his dreams and upon approaching Praque 
he confronts a guard at the city's bridge who laughs at the 
Rabbi's story and exclaims: 
Really, you poor fellow! Have you worn your shoes 
out wandering all this way only because of a dream? 
What sensible person would trust a dream? Why 
look, if I had been one to go trusting dreams, I 
should this very minute be doing just the opposite. 
I should have made just such a pilgrimage as this 
silly one of yours only in the opposite direction 
but no doubt with the same result. Let me tell 
you my dream. 
The sympathetic officer related his dream which spoke to him 
of Crakow, commanding him to search for a treasure in the house 
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of a Jewish rabbi whose name would be Eisek, son of Jekel. 
The guard went on to say: 
The treasure was to have been discovered buried in 
the dirty corner behind the stove of Eisek, son 
of Jekel. Fancy going to Crakow and pulling down 
the walls of every house in the ghetto, where half 
of the men are called Jekel and the other half 
Eisek! 
After hearing the guard's story, Rabbi Eisek hurried back to 
his distant home, dug in the "neglected corner of his house" 
and discovered the treasure. Zimmer concludes from the 
story that: 
The real treasure, to end our misery and trials, is 
never far away ... it lies buried in the inner 
most recess of our own home, that is to say, our own 
being. . . . But there is the odd and persistent 
fact that it is only after a faithful journey to a 
distant region, a foreign country, a strange land, 
that the meaning of the inner voice that is to guide 
our quest can be revealed to us. (p. 221) 
This metaphor of the journey and of the treasured truth 
which can be uncovered through dialogue with and openness to 
the "other" is, like Dunne's model of "passing over" and "com­
ing back," a tremendously supportive paradigm for the herme-
neutical "journey" of understanding which I have come to 
research and reflect upon. 
The ontological significance of the journey which estab­
lishes the persistent fact that meaning can only be found 
through communication and that understanding is involved with 
disclosure also suggests that this understanding is only possi­
ble if the dialogue is "about" something. And, although I 
personally have discovered that it is in the context of 
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religious experience, (the something "we are about"), which 
best informs us of the path to the inner voice and shared 
truths, this is surely a prejudice which is born out of my 
own choice of attention to particular readings. However, 
even in a very philosophical sense, such as in Apel's (1977) 
explanation, the notion of intersubjectivity as the "a priori" 
of communication can be argued. 
The "legitimacy" of these prejudgments and preunder-
standings that my own effective history in the tradition of 
work and school can reflect is, of course, a factor which 
conditions the understandings which I come to in "practice" 
as hermeneuticist. And yet, as Robinson points out, "herme-
neia, or interpretation, is constantly being carried out 
without calling attention to itself, as people seek to under­
stand one another and make themselves understood" (1963, p. 66). 
Consequently, the reflective turn to one's own historicality 
and tradition is a necessary component in the hermeneutical 
circle of understanding. The legitimacy of one's personal 
prejudices is therefore determined by the recognition that 
these prejudices do indeed inform one's perceptions, one's 
interpretations and one's understandings. I must recognize 
my prejudice toward the encounter, (ingrained in my experi­
ence as a "child of the '60's"), towards an attraction to 
the essential impediments to understanding, (a shared experi­
ence with those dispossessed by society—i.e., the prisoner, 
the radical), toward the indoctrinated consciousness of 
ultimate questions of "being-ness", (experienced in a 
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theological education), and toward the willingness to confront 
the tension of the dialectical moment, (also a valued "tech­
nique" in the theological debate as well as an effective ped­
agogical technique of the social sciences). 
Willis (1978) has discussed the qualitative evaluator 
in much the same way as I imagine the hermeneuticist: 
In contrast to the quantitative evaluator, who tends 
to see the world as largely determinate and non-
problematic, the qualitative evaluator tends to see 
the world as largely indeterminate and problematic; 
hence, its qualities are seen more directly as func­
tions of the perceptions and personal meanings the 
evaluator brings to the situation. (p. 4) 
Although more contemporary qualitative evaluators have sought 
a phenomenological "measure" of "common patterns of personal 
meanings," (Willis, 1978, p. 32) the ontological intentions 
which I hold as hermeneuticist are similarly qualified. One 
calls forth reflection upon the theory of interpretation and 
the problem of understanding when some impediment to under­
standing draws attention to the understanding process itself. 
The importance of the nature of the dialectical relation­
ship is an aspect of hermeneutics particular to recent theories 
which attempt to transcend the objectivity of the interpreter/ 
researcher and establish the "encounter" as the true experi­
ence of non-objectified accumulation of understanding—as 
Gadamer (1976) has claimed, a knowledge of the way things are 
in the not purely personal capacity. In other words, the 
inter-subjectivity inherent in dialectical encounters demands 
a recognition of reciprocity and dialogue as the methodology 
for gaining understanding. 
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As researcher, by choosing to wear the lens of philo­
sophical hermeneutics, I am presently ready to confront the sub­
ject matter of this inquiry again with a better self-under­
standing and to demonstrate the openness required for allowing 
a synthesis to emerge from the dialectical encounter of my­
self, as researcher, with the subject matter. 
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CHAPTER V 
HERMENEUTICS AND THE CURRICULUM 
The hermeneutical task of finding the right questions 
from which to begin understanding intersubjectivity has been 
made clearer by recognizing the ontological condition of his-
toricality that informs the preconceptions of one's questions. 
The self-reflective mode of inquiry, the phase of openness to 
one's own effective historical experience in the circle of 
understandings has itself opened up the realm of preunderstand-
ings out of which such questioning arises. Gadamer's (1976) 
analysis of this process of understanding is a good place to 
begin when considering the experience of education as an ex­
perience of intersubjectivity, and of the ontological being-
in-the-curriculum. 
Gadamer (1976) has compared the notion of the fusion of 
horizons (preunderstandings, prejudices) with dialogue be­
tween persons. When considering experience in school curriculum 
as dialogical experience—for intersubjectivity in the curricu­
lum is dependent on dialogue—then Gadamer's reference to this 
phenomenon is directly relevant to a concern with the fusion 
of horizons via school curriculum. 
The structure of questioning that determines dialogue 
as the dialectical encounter has also been discussed (Chapter 
I) as a characteristic of the inherent relationship between 
experiences in and with the curriculum and the hermeneutical 
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experience. The dialectical encounters between students and 
teachers, amongst students, teachers and the formal curricu­
lum, as well as amongst tother participants in schools, are 
explicit examples of the importance of questioning in the 
educational process. 
The different subject matter of dialogues in education 
reflects the different dimensions of the curriculum. The 
formal subject-matter curriculum can be thought of as the 
tradition-context, the general condition in which educational 
intersubjectivity is immersed. This "object" of experience 
in education—the subject matter curriculum—can be assessed 
in a different light when considered hermeneutically. These 
questions that are implicit to the subject-matter encourage 
dialogical/dialectical encounters amongst the participants 
in/with the curriculum. To recognize these questions requires 
an openness on the part of these participants. 
Another significant dimension of the curriculum is that 
which is particularly intersubjective in its own right—the 
hidden curriculum of interpersonal relationships amongst 
students, teachers, and the formal (subject) curriculum. This 
encounter in the curriculm lights up the horizons of students 
and teachers and conditions the possibility of,_ self-disclosure 
and self-understanding. It is the intersubjective curriculum 
that reflects the ontological conditions of hermeneutic in­
terest. The understanding (meaning) which emerges from the 
questions inherent in the intersubjective curriculum reflects 
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the significance in interpersonal relationships to our who-
listic understanding of the educational process. 
It is meaningless to try to separate the curriculum as 
either formal or intersubjective when discussing the tradition-
context or historicality of the curriculum. However, it is 
helpful to understand these parts when describing the onto-
logical aspect of a hermeneutic "analysis" of dialogue in the 
curriculum. Ott (1967) has provided a useful commentary about 
the intersubjective event of dialogue and the grounds for 
understanding this event. According to Ott, "persons are to­
g e t h e r  u n d e r  t h e  c l a i m s  o f  a  c o m m o n  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  . . .  i n  
which and confronting which they are first able to understand 
each other" (p. 15) . 
Although the common subject matter is not always the for­
mal disciplines of the curriculum in schools, it is important 
to be aware that these disciplines establish the explicit 
tradition-context of our being-in-the-curriculum. Consequent­
ly, both the implicit, hidden curriculum of intersubjectivity 
and the explicit, formal curriculum make-up the historicality 
of intersubjective relationships in the school. 
Another significant characteristic of the curriculum 
that defines its historicality is its reflection of linguis-
ticality. We belong to the tradition of curriculum only 
through the language which emerges in our understanding of 
curriculum. The deeper meaning of the curriculum, or rather 
the curriculum that transcends the limits of any particular 
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curriculum content, is recognized in and through the media­
tion between the conscious familiar elements of the curricu­
lum and the alien (hidden, intersubjective) reality in the 
curriculum. The language of intersubjectivity and of the con­
crete curriculum is this mediative phenomenon that provides 
a means for making possible agreements that broaden the hori­
zons of participants in the (whole) curriculum. 
The Hermeneutical Circle and 
Interpretive Analysis 
The hermeneutical circle of understanding the curriculum 
can be assumed to be conditioned by the give and take in dia­
logue amongst school participants. In beginning to describe 
a 'method of approach or an application of the hermeneutic 
perspective in assessing the dialogical relationships in the 
curriculum, some further comments regarding the hermeneutic 
circle may be helpful. 
The hermeneutic circle of understanding is a condition 
posited by Gadamer for the possibility of human experience 
and inquiry. Formulated variously in different theories of 
hermeneutics, the circle generally describes how, in the pro­
cess of understanding and interpretation, part and whole are 
related in a circular way: in order to understand the whole, 
it is necessary to understand the parts, while to understand 
the parts it is necessary to have some comprehension of the 
whole. Gadamer's (1976) philosophy in hermeneutics accounts 
for the primordial reciprocity between the interpreter and 
the interpreted and can be used to suggest that the 
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self-understanding of the participants (interpreters) in educa­
tion conditions the manner in which the curriculum is under­
stood. In turn, the curriculum as both the tradition of 
intersubjectivity and the formal subject-matter in education 
conditions the self-understanding of the participants (teach­
ers, students, administrators, etc.) in this tradition. 
Approaching the hermeneutical circle objectively is an 
ideal which prevents the interpreter as researcher from gen­
uinely understanding its conditions. This is basically what 
distinguishes the epistemological model of inquiry, which 
generally posits the ideal of scientific objectivity (e.g., 
in the Cartesian tradition of rigorous deduction) and of pre-
suppositionless knowledge, from the ontological claims of 
Gadamer's (1976) hermeneutics, which is based on Heidegger's 
(1962) view that all understanding presupposes a prior grasp, 
a pre-understanding of the whole. 
Any interpretive or critical humanistic approach to 
understanding relationships in education must recognize this 
circle of understanding as fundamental to its assumptions and 
findings. Whether or not one can approach ontology "scientifi­
cally" (with accompanying methodical expectations) is an im­
portant question which the perspective established in philo­
sophical hermeneutics has been willing to challenge. Furthermore, 
the traditional approach relating cognitive interests with 
observable and measurable cultural phenomena must ask itself 
if an understanding (as opposed to knowledge) of the human 
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being in the educational context can be realized with only 
epistemological and phenomenological lens. 
In choosing to use the lens of Gadamer's hermeneutics, 
and as researcher/interpreter of the circle of understanding 
in the context of the school, I must affirm the ontological 
perspective. Although I must also acknowledge the phenomena 
of school relationships as the material givenness of the 
situations which I choose to discuss, the deeper ontological 
interests in intersubjectivity will ultimately determine the 
"method" of interpretation. Bozarth-Campbell (1979) has helped 
in distinguishing this approach from the strictly phenomeno­
logical perspective: 
. . . seeking a way of access belonging to inter­
pretation means discovering the observable charac­
teristics of the processes and entering into a 
dialogue with them—questioning, listening, and 
responding to them. (p. 3) 
Consequently, the dialogical requirements of the interpreter's 
participation with the phenomena being studied, (in this case, 
intersubjectivity in schools), will determine the ultimate 
understanding of the ontological significance of the study 
itself. Furthermore, it will most importantly determine the 
"technique" or method for analyzing the situations under study. 
(The interpretive technique, in turn, will reflect the find­
ings of the analysis.) 
Boundaries for a Hermeneutical Analysis 
The historical and linguistic conditions which have in­
fluenced and are influencing this particular writing are also 
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ontologically significant to my application of the hermeneu-
tic lens to an interpretation of specific experiences reflect­
ing intersubjectivity in school. The linguistic conditions 
which reflect our being and sharing a social tradition often 
also reflect very particular nuances when studied in a school 
setting. Although the language shared in schools is not 
necessarily distinct from that shared in any other social en­
vironment or institution, it is very much influenced by the 
structure of relationships that are generally informed by the 
curriculum of activities in the school. Certain language 
phenomena reflect a tradition of student/teacher/adminis­
trator/custodian/coach/etc. roles. And, insofar as this tra­
dition does not pose a problem to the interpreter who assumes 
the task of investigating the interactions amongst these 
roles, it is not problematic for the interpretive method. 
However, acknowledging that this tradition does exist and 
that certain peculiarly school-related functions and relation­
ships (curricula) reflect this tradition is an important in­
fluence upon the interpretation. 
The (a priori) tradition-context of language in the 
school can be assumed by the interpreter to be a normative 
element or condition that controls and maintains relationships 
in the tradition. Any reason to question the mediating func­
tion of the language used would in part be a questioning of 
the tradition. Although this is not a problem to my particu­
lar interests as interpreter, I do think that there remains 
a need to question the phenomena of linguistic barriers to 
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greater understanding amongst the participants in schbols. 
The language used by teachers often reflects areas in the for­
mal curriculum which may be totally beyond the experience of 
the students. But more than this, the traditional and dia­
lectical nature of posing questions and assigning tasks to 
students, as well as the traditional ("acceptable") questions 
and responses from students to teachers and the curriculum 
are very challenging problems to an interpreter who is in­
terested in analyzing the influence of these dialectical en­
counters upon the fulfillment of understanding amongst stu­
dents and teachers. 
The tradition-context of the language phenomena in schools 
establishes the historicality of experiences and interrelation­
ships in schools. Although there are many other possible in­
stitutional norms and conditions (e.g., spatial uses in the 
classroom and school in general and routines of bells and 
instructional procedures), which help to define the histori­
city of relationships in schools, none represent the onto-
logical nature of the human condition in educational inter-
subjectivity as does language. Reflecting upon this histori­
cality does, however, encourage the interpreter to acknowledge 
the ongoing fixedness of relationships in schools and how 
this has informed the degree of understanding, or the pat­
terns of understanding, which can be described. This fixed­
ness is problematical and necessarily questioned when the 
interpreter assumes that there are problems of understanding 
in the present conditions of intersubjectivity in schools. 
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Assuming for the purposes of this study that these con­
ditions of linguisticality and historicality define the ul­
timately ontological nature of human beingness and that a 
hermeneutical approach for interpreting situational charac­
teristics of these conditions in schools requires attention 
to the active phenomena which reflect these conditions, then 
it is necessary to set some boundaries as to how the situa­
tions of intersubjectivity are to be discussed. 
Situations of intersubjectivity can first be recognized 
as phenomenological characteristics of the existentially 
grounded hermeneutical circle. The goal of the hermeneu­
tical circle is to achieve a unity of sense. Consequently, 
a sense of the whole must first be projected as initially 
meaningful. This whole must therefore be discussed as it 
relates to the situations of intersubjectivity in schools. 
For the analysis that is soon to follow, the whole reflects 
the understanding of the curriculum (both formal and hidden) 
through the interaction of students and teachers both in and 
with the curriculum. The hidden curriculum of intersubjec-
tive relationships is itself obviously a part of the precon­
ceived meaning of schooling reflected in the preunderstandings 
of all participants in the school. 
Another boundary which I have chosen to place for this 
analysis of situations in schools is to consider these pheno­
menological characteristics in a descriptive reference rather 
than to interpret them as if dialogues between students and 
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teachers were historical "texts." Although it would be quite 
relevant to a hermeneutic interpretation of the dialogues to 
consider them as a text, I have chosen simply to describe what 
I consider to be the qualitatively hermeneutic characteristics 
implicit to the dialogues—in other words, a description of 
what I hear to be reflective of a hermeneutic situation. The 
problem of understanding the curriculum that is explicit in 
the dialogues is what is important here—not the problem of 
analyzing the dialogues as themselves needing to be interpreted 
as significant to the tradition from which they have been 
taken out of context. 
The choice of taping dialogues amongst students and teach­
ers is itself a choice of method. This satisfies a justifi­
cation for applying the hermeneutic lens in discussing inter-
subjectivity in schools. The method of dialogue, whether it 
is to be used as a control of interactions in any field or 
more narrowly as a tool for instruction in education, pre­
supposes the net result of understanding. Certainly the 
grounding of the tradition of relationships in education is 
found in methodical dialogue. However, many interactions 
in schools which are characteristically considered dialogical 
fail to reflect the particular qualities of the hermeneutic 
dialogue. Therefore, I will briefly classify those charac­
teristics in dialogue that are hermeneutically significant. 
The hermeneutic techne or practice of dialogue is de­
scribed by Gadamer (1976) as being acquired through experience, 
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not learned. However, in order to discuss those particular 
situations (experiential) which qualify as hermeneutic dia­
logue it is necessary to differentiate them from patterns 
(or structures) that can be systematically learned and "ap­
plied" as hermeneutic practice in dialogue. 
Heinrich Ott (1967) has attempted to list those ingredi­
ents of hermeneutic dialogue which presuppose a methodologi­
cal development toward genuine understanding amongst the 
partners in dialogue. These include: (a) paraphrasing— 
formulating someone else's words into our own; (b) affirma­
tion that contradicting a dialogue partner can be an expres­
sion of disagreement; (c) acknowledgment that dialogue partners 
are understood only when the subject matter of the dialogue 
is understood; (d) acknowledgment that that which the dialogue part­
ner says last is normally decisive and most important; (e) af­
firmation that thoughts can change in the course of a dialogue 
so that finally something new results, "which nonetheless was 
already there when the dialogue began"; and (f) willingness 
to lift a thought out of its context in order to legitimate 
the importance of the subject matter to the dialogue (pp. 23-
31) . 
Ott states that these should not be considered as gen­
eral rules which would be valid always and everywhere. In­
stead he considers these as "structures" of dialogue occur­
ring in certain cases, "the knowledge of which may be her-
meneutically helpful" (1976, p. 22). Ott's structures are 
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very important to the phenomenological assessment of the her-
meneutic encounter in dialogue. They, moreover, provide cri­
teria suggesting a methodical approach toward the analysis of 
any dialogical "text." 
Although Ott (1967) disregards the normative aspect of 
this structural analysis, the phenomenological practice of 
categorizing definite structures in the process of interpre­
tation suggests a narrow sense of the hermeneutic paradigm. 
I, instead, would rather acknowledge the phenomenological 
"objectivity" as researcher/interpreter while also affirming 
the ontological interests in those speculative preconcep­
tions and questions which are significant to a more philo­
sophically hermeneutical analysis of dialogue. The charac­
teristics of such a hermeneutical analysis, though remaining 
phenomenological in the everyday (concrete) description of 
the dialogue experience, also reflect a more imaginative, 
speculative or contemplative openness to possibilities 
of greater understanding that transcends the particularly 
situational phenomena of the dialogue itself. These char­
acteristics should include: 
1. An openness to the questions of all participants 
in dialogue, including the subject matter itself. This, 
of course, requires the capacity to posit what is question­
able in the subject matter and to formulate questions that 
question the subject matter further, (i.e., to risk involve­
ment with the subject matter); 
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2. Acknowledging what can be called an element of bouy-
ancy that leads the dialogue (i.e., the movement—give and 
take—between questions and responses and amongst the dialogue 
partners); 
3. An openness to unintended developments in the dia­
logue—or rather, a willingness to expect the unexpected 
and move tangentially toward broader dimensions in under­
standing the subject matter and where it can take the relation­
ship in dialogue (This is similar to Ott's structure de­
scribed in letter (e) above.); 
4. Acknowledging the reflexivity experienced by the 
dialogue partners; 
5. Affirming the transubjective mediation that takes 
place in dialogue. In other words, understanding via inter-
subjective dialogue is like a transaetion--subjective con­
sciousness alone cannot make an ultimate claim to the meaning 
of the subject matter (The essential dialectic must be 
recognized as new meaning unfolds.); and 
6. Acknowledging the conditioning affects of language, 
tradition, and history and the boundaries created by these 
factors. 
Ott's (1967) strictly phenomenological structure for ex­
plaining the hermeneutical relevance of the dialogical ex­
perience has been expanded somewhat by this more ontological 
description of the phenomenological foundations of dialogue. 
Although there are obvious references to the concrete ex­
perience of dialogical/dialectical questioning and reflecting, 
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the philosophical ontological interest in understanding qua 
understanding is, I hope, a recognizably significant charac­
teristic of the hermeneutic-dialectical criteria that I have 
suggested. 
These differences in analysis between the strictly pheno-
menological method of bracketing in order to explain the her-
meneutic dialogue and the philosophical (ontological) open­
ness to the emerging meaning inherent in the intersubjective 
and dialectical nature of hermeneutic mediation via dialogue 
require a different approach to the text of dialogues in 
educational contexts. An example of this approach will now 
be demonstrated as I relate these characteristics to a taped 
recording of teacher-student(s) dialogues. 
An Example of Hermeneutical Analysis 
As has been stated throughout this paper, recognition of 
the hermeneutic dimension in our efforts to find meaning 
through greater understanding aids awareness of our own par­
ticipation in creating meaning. In that this study is in­
tended to provide some substance to an understanding of what 
can be called participant-hermeneutics, my own self-reflec­
tive awareness of those preunderstandings and preconceptions 
that unavoidably influence the chosen approach to this re­
search is a significant matter. Unlike the carefully directed 
procedures of an empirical study which are intended to limit 
any biased, unreliable or invalid factors from interfering 
with the selection of a study sample, the application of the 
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hermeneutic lens of interpretation requires an acknowledgement 
that such prejudices and controlling variables are the true 
determinants of the interpretive sample for research. 
As Vandenberg (1974) has pointed out, initiative to be­
gin an interpretive study is born out of the recognition that 
some problem exists in understanding. Awareness of this prob­
lem is itself not simply a presumption of this understanding, 
but is grounded in some tension that exists between my pre­
conceptions, i.e., preconceptions concerning the subject of 
research, and the understanding that I initially project re­
lating to this particular subject. Speaking more directly 
about the role of the teacher as researcher/interpreter pre­
paring lessons concerning a subject curriculum, sensitivity 
to the students' needs for expressing and exploring their 
own preconceptions or preunderstandings of the subject-
matter in the formal curriculum is a prerequisite of open­
ness essential to the hermeneutic experience of teaching and 
learning. This sensitivity, or rather hermeneutic affirma­
tion, is an important step toward approaching the problems 
that hinder the sharing of understanding which reflects teach-
er-student intersubjectivity. 
The openness which also reflects the hermeneutic-inter-
pretive endeavor is hindered by the possible measures of con­
trol which the teaching role demonstrates in our Western 
tradition of schooling. Whether this authoritarian role is 
a legitimate means for manipulating relationships in order 
to assist in the achievement of greater understanding is a 
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question which enlivens my interest in interpersonal relation­
ships in schools. As this particular study proceeds with the 
application of an interpretive analysis of exemplary student-
teacher interaction in dialogue, I will attempt to respond to 
the issue of teacher authority and the experience of inter-
subjectivity in schools, 
I will begin by describing how intersubjective relation­
ships in schools have become initially meaningful to me as 
teacher and researcher, and then move on to provide an exam­
ple of a hermeneutic-interpretive analysis which will demon­
strate attention to the characteristics of hermeneutic ex­
perience pointed out earlier. 
The ontological and conditional nature of demonstrating 
a hermeneutical analysis of intersubjectivity suggests an 
affirmation that I have gained a greater understanding of 
relationships in schools through my own experience. I have 
done so not through a distant and objective observation of 
interpersonal relationships in schools—e.g., by entering 
previously unvisited schools and classrooms and taping or 
taking notes from situations of interest. I have become aware 
—been able to make sense—of situations by experiencing them 
as a participant-teacher. I have subsequently been able to 
project an initial understanding of problems which have en­
couraged an interpretive approach for even greater understanding. 
I am not saying that it is only the participants in a 
situation who can ultimately and adequately make claims to 
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the hermeneutic-interpretive understanding of that situation. 
Experiencing other dialogical roles, e.g., interviewing, in 
interaction with students and teachers in schools, is an ob­
viously legitimate approach toward interpreting the experi­
ences of the students and teachers. The more traditional 
methods of obtaining "data" regarding such interactions, e.g. 
ethnomethodological studies, are, however, more concerned with 
phenomenological findings than with possibilities for the 
emergence of ontological truths. 
My prejudice or conviction as researcher and as an ad­
herent to the philosophical-hermeneutic interests in the con­
ditions of intersubjective relationships in schools, allows 
me, requires me, to talk from my own experience. Such a 
directed, hermeneutical-interpretive approach is free from 
the structurally designed quantitative interests in objective 
findings, and free to explore the potential for using a 
dialogical/dialectical model of hermeneutics. 
Such metaphors as the journey and the search help to 
depict the frame of reference which applied hermeneutics in­
vites. The speculative nature of an ontological orientation 
to hermeneutics is, however, limited to the historical 
perspective, i.e., the conditions, of the interpreter. And, 
therefore, the examples of intersubjective interaction which 
I find reflect the characteristics of hermeneutical experi­
ence are quite relative to my own interpretation of these 
examples. 
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I have chosen one experience as a teacher in discussion 
with students in a classroom interaction to point out the 
hermeneutic reality of intersubjective dialogue. This is 
only a sample of the innumerable possible choices of inter­
actions in the school. Any situation in the classroom, the 
lunchroom, the hall or the school office is useful for dis­
cussing the characteristically hermeneutic dimension of inter-
subjectivity. Obviously, those contexts in which active 
dialogue is taking place are better for exemplifying the her-
meneutics of human interaction in schools. My choice is a 
situation in my own classroom and a part of the historical, 
onqoing relationship in which I participate daily. This 
choice, of course, acknowledges the prejudice I hold toward 
the classroom context for illustrating the hermeneutic re­
lationship. 
The classroom is traditionally the center of activities 
concerning the formal curriculum. It is also significantly 
a context for other parts of the whole curriculum, especially 
what I have discussed as the curriculum of intersubjectivity 
or the "hidden" curriculum. Those dimensions of experience 
which help to construct the ever-changing historicity of 
relationships in schools are the remaining parts of the 
curriculum. 
The hermeneutic reality or experience in schools can 
be discussed in terms of the hermeneutic circle. The re­
lationship of these parts of the curriculum to the whole, 
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and vice versa, determines the possibilities for understanding 
how understanding itself is conditioned in the school con­
text. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the educational arena 
to the hermeneutic endeavor of interpretation and understand­
ing is its assumed purpose of teaching and learning which, if 
these roles are to be successful, demand attention to and de­
velopment of expertise in understanding skills and possibili­
ties . 
It is neither an interpretive interest in gaining a 
better understanding of the affect of the formal curriculum 
on classroom intersubjectivity, nor an interest in gaining 
a better understanding of the historical and/or traditional 
conditions of the particular text of dialogue that has been 
taped that is the criterion for the decision to apply the 
hermeneutic lens of interpretation to my experience as teach­
er. It is the dialogue itself, the substance of the inter-
subjective relationship in the classroom discussion which 
will be analyzed in the hermeneutic dialogical/dialectical 
mode. 
The problem of understanding the curriculum of inter-
subjective dialogue amongst students and teachers is not only 
a hypothetical concern of this hermeneutic endeavor. My 
own pedagogical interests in relating to my students and to 
the variety of curriculum experiences in the school has 
generally informed the impulse to approach this problem. 
And, most importantly, the specific problems inherent in the 
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dialogue taped remain with me as I reflect upon the degree of 
pedagogical success that I have maintained as a teacher at­
tempting to build and participate in intersubjective relation­
ships in school intended to accomplish a number of goals, not 
the least of which are reflected in efforts to better relate 
as human to human and to exchange knowledge, ideas, and under­
standings about the formal curriculum with students and other 
teachers. 
In the taped session, a group of nine students is sit­
ting in a traditional classroom in which the seating arrange­
ment is circular, a design used to help facilitate dialogical 
interaction. The number of students is small, but does not 
suggest that a larger gathering could not be used for such 
an interpretive analysis. 
The formal curriculum in this context relates to a 
variety of topics in the humanities that are directed toward 
Joyce's text, Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. At the 
time of the taped session, the class had become somewhat 
oriented to the arts and theories of artistic expression. 
The dialogue that follows was the first in a series of ses­
sions pertaining to our discussion of Joyce's text. Since it 
was the first, I explained to the students the reason for 
using the tape-recorder and invited questions and concerns 
from the students. The interpretive analysis of the dialogue, 
located in the right margin, generally parallels those sig­
nificant interactions or points in the discussion that char­
acterize the hermeneutic-dialectical experience: 
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Classroom Dialogue 
Teacher: Let me tell you what 
I am doing with the recorder. 
I am undertaking a project and 
I want to ask you to partici­
pate. After I have explained 
it, if you want to question 
its purpose or disavow your 
participation, you are wel­
come to. I'll try to make 
the explanation simple. It 
has to do with a paper that I 
am writing that involves re­
lationships between students, 
between students and teachers, 
and in general, relationships 
between people in schools. . . 
OK? And my proposition is 
that one good way to under­
stand these relationships is 
to record conversations, in­
structions, class discussions 
and so on with people that I 
have to deal with in schools 
and then listen to.the re­
cordings later and make my 
Interpretive Analysis 
In addition to the obvious 
ethical ramifications of 
consent for participation 
in the study, the explana­
tion made by the teacher 
is also significant to con­
structing a stage of open­
ness for the students to 
participate in the decision­
making surrounding the tap­
ing of class discussion. 
This participation, of course, 
is dependent on their un­
derstanding the reasoning 
for the recording. This 
degree of explanation from 
the teacher is in line with 
the historicity of relation­
ships in the class—that is, 
the basis of what I now per­
ceive as the relationship 
with the class. To say such 
a thing as, "I presume that 
you would get used to it 
after awhile," is not a 
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own interpretations of what I 
think is going on, share that 
interpretation with the people 
who participate in the record­
ing and eventually discuss 
certain aspects that have been 
recorded. This is why the 
recording is necessary—so that 
I will have a record as if it 
were a textbook, written down, 
of things that go on in 
schools. And, if you don't 
mind, I would like to do it a 
couple of days. If it seems 
to be an inconvenience to you, 
then we'll not do it. I pre­
sume that you will get used to 
it after awhile. I know that 
I already have because I have 
completed other recordings 
like this in other situations. 
What do you think? (pause) Do 
you understand my reasons for 
taping? 
Interpretive Analysis 
reflection of the kind of 
authority which often al­
lows the teacher to be over­
bearing and make such a 
presumption. This "pre­
sumption" is,I believe, 
understandable to the stu­
dents and clearly an invi­
tation for their comments. 
Moreover, also involved in 
this transaction with the 
students is the posing of 
the problem of participation 
itself. The choice of the 
teachers to do this or that 
with or in the curriculum 
is problematic, i.e., the 
curriculum of intersubjec-
tivity must be acknowledged 
before genuine dialogue 
amongst students and teach­
ers is possible and failure 
to acknowledge such inter-
subjectivity creates further 
problems in approaching the 
formal curriculum. 
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Classroom Dialogue 
John P.: It's going to be hard 
to get used to talking when 
you know it's being recorded. 
Debbie: Just act like it's 
not there. 
John P.; It would probably 
be better . . . no, I guess 
that would be dishonest if 
you just decided not to tell 
us, then we'd act natural 
. . . and then you could tell 
us after you'd done it . . . 
and then if everybody wants to 
. . . we'd say yeh, you can 
go ahead and use our record­
ing. 
John T.: To get it more 
natural, you could like put 
it on your desk and just let 
it sit there and not tell us 
if it is on or off and let 
us just get used to it being 
there. 
Janis: I can tell that it's 
on now, 'cause I can see those 
things moving. 
Interpretive Analysis 
The students respond to this 
subject matter, i.e., the 
recording problem, with the 
same dimension of concern 
for the process. The bouy-
ancy in this interaction of 
student with student and 
with teacher is hermeneu-
tically significant. That 
suggestions can be made about 
the curriculum of activities 
by the students is a matter 
reflecting transubjectivity 
and the mediation of roles. 
Openness to someone's hy­
pothesizing, i.e., John P.'s 
"It would probably be better 
. . comment, is also sig­
nificant to the possibilities 
of unintended meaning in 
the curriculum. John P.'s 
concern this time for pro­
cess is taken by John T. as 
an opportunity to acknow­
ledge the conditioning ef­
fects of the recorder. This, 
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Classroom Dialogue 
John T.: Yeh. I guess it has 
to be right there to pick 
everything up. 
Chris: YoU could, put it 
right in the middle of the 
floor to make it look incon­
spicuous. (all laugh) 
Teacher; I have thought of 
some of those things you've 
mentioned—(moves tape re­
corder to the center)—It 
could be our "totem pole" 
for the day. (laughter 
again) We can just try it 
here, OK? Let me just say 
that even though we're just 
discussing this whole process, 
Interpretive Analysis 
consequently, allows the 
responses to move toward 
broader dimensions in the 
subject matter of the re­
corder, i.e., the placement 
of the recorder. Like most 
teachers wanting to "get back" 
to an orientation with the 
formal curriculum, I at­
tempted to relate the issue 
of the recorder, i.e., to 
manipulate the dialogue, 
to our earlier studies, 
(the class history), of the 
American Indian culture. 
As any good "participant— 
hermeneuticist," I felt that 
an affirmation of the medi­
ation inherent in the dis­
cussion concerning this 
decision-making process 
should be made. This also 
reflects an openness to the 
conditions of teacher-stu­
dent intersubjectivity and 
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that to me is very important. 
What I want you to understand 
is that even though we are tak­
ing time to decide whether it 
is worth it, whether it's going 
to be an inconvenience—causing 
some people to be quiet, others 
to talk, (some chuckle), to me 
that sort of discussion is what 
is important amongst people in 
schools. OK, let's start with 
Portrait of the Artist and then 
to the Renaissance material 
that we were with ... I asked 
you to come to class today with 
an example of something . . . 
Who remembers what that was? 
Debbie; Something about what 
we thought about Stephen's 
ideas of the future . . . 
Something like that . . . 
Teacher; Something relevant 
to the future in Stephen 
Dedalus's life? . . . Was 
that it? . . . 
Interpretive Analysis 
and the continuing (histori­
cal) nature of the "hidden 
curriculum"—e.g., the use 
of the recorder. The give-
and take dialogue in the 
hidden curriculum of inter-
subjectivity can be compared 
to the activity of a game 
in which teams (or players) 
exchange "possession" of a 
ball or instrument. In the 
school, this "instrument" is 
"passed around" in some dis­
cussion contexts as in many 
institutionally controlled 
relationships. However, as 
is often the case with in­
stitutional relationships, 
intersubjectivity is also 
affected by the role of the 
authority which is displayed 
by certain designated par­
ticipants—e.g., the teach­
er in schools. In the inter­
pretive context discussed 
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Classroom Dialogue 
John T.; I think that Joyce 
was preoccupied with cold, 
clammy, bog water . . . (laugh) 
Teacher; Wait a minute now. 
I'm trying to get out our 
topic. . . We need to be in 
some agreement . . . Debbie, 
you seemed to have been Say­
ing something different than 
what John said. 
Debbie: Well, something that 
Stephen dwelled on. 
Interpretive Analysis 
here, the teacher's respon­
sibility to "oversee" or 
"guide" the learning of the 
student, becomes an active 
ingredient in the under­
standing of a particular 
subject matter. Because 
of the historical conditions 
of this control by the teach­
er, the hermeneutic charac­
teristic of openness to the 
questions of all the parti­
cipants in the classroom 
becomes an important com­
ponent in the teacher's own 
interpretive "repertoire." 
The type or quality of "argu­
ments" made by the teacher, 
therefore, become important 
to ah analysis of the dia­
logue amongst the partici­
pants in the classroom that 
involves these directives. 
In this particular dialogue, 
the assignment to come to 
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Classroom Dialogue 
Teacher: OK. Do you remem­
ber? . . . (to class) an ex­
ample of something that he 
seemed to be interested in 
that we come to know through 
his thoughts. OK? . . . 
What you thought was particu­
lar to his interests . . . 
(one student begins to speak) 
Just a minute. Isn't it true 
that basically what we're 
reading are his (Stephen's) 
thoughts?—descriptions of 
incidents through his re­
flections, right? They are 
not happening at the time. 
Interpretive Analysis 
class with some reaction to 
the subject matter of the 
formal curriculum, i.e., 
Stephen Dedalus's view of 
the world, is quite open-
, ended and "passes the ball" 
back to the students so that 
the buoyancy of the dialogue 
is maintained. 
The "ball", i.e., the assign­
ment for discussion, must 
first be partially under­
stood. The interpretive 
process of reflecting upon 
the assignment, and reaching 
some consensus concerning 
its meaning, is demonstrated 
here—obviously by the in­
sistence (authority) of the 
teacher. But certainly not 
without some sensitivity to 
the mediation or reciprocity 
that makes this clarifica­
tion of the assignment un­
derstood and meaningful. 
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Classroom Dialogue 
I am under the impression that 
what we're reading is a great 
big flashback. 
John P.; The way he describes 
something that's already hap­
pened. 
Teacher; Right. Why don't we 
go around and let everybody 
tell us something that they 
found in reading that particu­
larly interested Stephen. If 
you have written any notes, 
then please refer to them . . . 
Janis? . . . (sees she has no 
notes) ... or you can just 
tell us about it. 
Janis: When Stephen was, 
uhm . . . punished by the 
prefect of studies and he 
thought, he considered, it 
was for no reason. And I 
thought that, you know, that 
was a pretty important thing. 
It made him think that this 
is unfair and it made him 
Interpretive Analysis 
A thought here concerning the 
students' reflections and 
reactions to the subject-
matter—Stephen Dedalus's 
interests and experiences— 
might help to further dem­
onstrate the implicit sig­
nificance of the students. 
The choices of thoughts or 
experiences shared by the 
students that relate to their 
reflections about the char­
acter in their own inter­
pretive study are relative 
to each student's own ex­
periential/historical con­
ditioning. Those important 
matters that the students 
feel are worth bringing-up 
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Classroom Dialogue 
go up to a higher person to 
talk to. Rather than going 
to the teacher or going back 
to the priest that did that, 
he went up to the Rector and 
asked him why it happened and 
tried not to cry. He felt 
good about it. 
Teacher: Alright. . . I'm 
just going to jot this down 
and we'll continue to go 
around. I think that's a 
very good choice, Janis. 
Chris, what did you write 
down or find? 
Chris: I thought that all 
of the politics talked about 
at the dinner table was 
important . . .(pause) 
Teacher; Was it just 
politics? 
Chris: Mostly. 
Teacher: What kind of 
politics? 
Chris: I can't remember? 
Interpretive Analysis 
are not only those "answers" 
that they feel the teacher 
is seeking. They are un­
avoidably those matters 
which, for various reasons, 
relate to their own experi­
ence , make sense to the stu­
dent 's personally. This is 
the mediation of meaning or 
"fusion of horizons" which 
is indicative of the hermen-
uetic relationship between 
the students and the subject 
matter, e.g., the literary 
text being discussed. The 
teacher who understands the 
potentiality for such medi­
ation will attempt to set 
up or create tension in 
the types of questions he/she 
asks in order to fulfill 
these possibilities. This 
requires an openness which 
is very often tremendously 
rewarding for all partici­
pants in the classroom. 
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Teacher; Can you remember 
any of the specific things 
that were said? 
Chris: (pause) 
Teacher: (to class) You can 
help him if you'd like. 
John P.; They talked about 
religion. 
Teacher; Well, one of you 
says religion, and the other 
p o l i t i c s  . . .  
John P.: Well, then, let's 
just say the current hap­
penings around the area, 
the town. 
Teacher: Do you want to 
tell us some of the speci­
fic happenings then? 
John P.: No, But it's kind 
of like what families do when 
they get together for the 
holiday, you know they talk 
about things like this . . . 
Teacher; OK, Cheryl, you 
were going to say something? 
Interpretive Analysis 
It is certainly an acknow­
ledgement of the condition­
ing effects of the students' 
personal-historical experi­
ences with the curriculum 
which encourages the quality 
and type of question a teach­
er will ask relating to the 
formal curriculum. Of course, 
the curriculum itself is 
perhaps just as important in 
formulating the quality of 
questions. The formal, sub­
ject matter curriculum is 
constantly "questioning" 
the being-ness of the stu­
dents and teachers. Our 
task as participants in and 
with this curriculum is to 
listen for these questions. 
In the case under study here, 
the text of Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man seems 
quite fitting to this task. 
It reflects a not-too-distant 
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Cheryl: No, just thinking. . . 
Teacher: What did you find 
about Stephen? 
Cheryl; I wrote the same 
thing as Janis. 
Teacher: Was it for the 
same reason? 
Cheryl: Well, I just said 
that it was important to him 
because he was not sure 
whether he should go up to 
the Rector about what hap­
pened. But he did. And 
despite the fact that he 
was afraid he did it any­
way. 
Teacher; So this incident 
shows some signs of maturi­
ty in Stephen? (Cheryl nods) 
Janis? Are you saying this 
too? 
Janis: Yes. 
Teacher: So, in this inci­
dent, you see a definite 
change occurring in his 
personality. 
Interpretive Analysis 
historical experience—the 
"schooling" of a young man 
in search of a better under­
standing of himself and the 
world—another recognizably 
hermeneutic endeavor in 
which Stephen Dedalus, the 
"symbolic" young man, fuses 
his own horizons of thought 
and experience with a desire 
to communicate with a (theo­
retical) ideal of beauty. 
As a teacher, a prejudice 
that I consistently reflected 
upon as I "directed" this 
particular classroom dia­
logue was the interest in 
assisting my students to 
fulfill a similar understand­
ing by guiding them in their 
understanding of Stephen's 
thoughts and experiences and 
how this may relate to their 
own experiences and feelings. 
However, often this preju­
dicial desire of the teacher 
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Janis: Yes (Cheryl, nods 
again) 
Teacher; That's interest­
ing. OK. Charlene? 
Charlene: Well, I, uhm, 
found the part about him 
dwelling on being cold and 
wet, clammy hands and he 
feels uncomfortable with 
being cold and wet. And 
he talks about the strong, 
big rat knocked into him 
in the ditch when he fell. 
Teacher: OK. You're point­
ing out some other things. 
Are there other objects 
associated with these feel­
ings, those sensations he 
has—coldness, wetness 
can you think of any others? 
Charlene: Uhm . . . repeat 
what you're asking? 
Teacher: Are there other 
objects that Stephen associ­
ates with coldness and 
Interpretive Analysis 
to nurture the interaction 
of the student with the for­
mal subject matter becomes 
manipulative and forbids op­
portunities to step beyond 
the formal curriculum. Al­
though it may appear in this 
context of discussion that 
the tension of possible mis­
understanding is a potentially 
useful problem created by 
the teacher's questioning, 
it can also be interpreted as a 
mis-use of authority that limits 
the possibilities of self-under­
standing as well as understand­
ing the subject matter. 
In reflection, I sense that 
this series of interactions 
with the students is quite 
manipulative and the inter­
pretations of the teacher 
concerning Stephen Dedalus's 
maturing personality is 
possibly focusing itself 
121 
Classroom Dialogue 
dampness? (Some students 
speak out—"hands, he said 
about his hands") 
(pause) 
Teacher; OK, Charlene. 
You are suggesting sort of 
a general feeling he had. 
I am probing to see if 
there were other specific 
objects that become 
associated with those 
feelings. I think that 
as he is maturing here, 
he is associating sen­
sations with objects, 
(pause) What were you 
going to say, Cheryl? 
Cheryl: I was going to 
say that John mentioned 
that Stephen had begun 
thinking of friends like 
that. He was always talk­
ing about the girl who had 
cold, icy fingers. 
Teacher: Oh, yes, good! 
Interpretive Analysis 
upon the students1 own un­
derstanding of the discussion 
topic. 
On the other hand, certain 
responses, implicit to the 
students' projections of 
meaning concerning the sub­
ject of discussion do point 
out their individual prior 
understandings of Stephen 
Dedalus's experiences and 
feelings. Such matters as 
justice, fairness, initiative, 
maturity, and feelings them-
self reflect the responses 
of the students related to 
the incident of Stephen1s 
experience in going to the 
Rector after being punished 
by the Prefect of studies. 
These are examples of the 
students' dialogue with the 
text and not the intersub-
jective interaction with the 
teacher. Through this 
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Debbie: And he even talked like 
that about the school, too. 
Teacher: Yes. Remember he 
used the description "ivory 
tower"? We sometimes hear this 
and I think this relates to 
what you are saying about his 
(Stephen's) sensations. Joyce 
seems to use the notion of 
"ivory towers" in Stephen's 
perception of the world. 
Stephen is at a stage in his 
life where he isn't sure what 
that concept—that metaphor— 
the "ivory tower"—really 
means. 
Debbie: He also talks about 
how gentle the Prefect's 
hands were. 
Interpretive Analysis 
interpretive reflection that 
I have experienced as teach­
er, I know now that I bet­
ter understand the impor­
tance of this relationship 
of the student with the text 
and that I have learned from 
this reflection the need to 
pose questions with less 
control over the direction 
of the students' responses. 
Although the teacher is a 
participant in the dialogue 
relating to the curriculum, 
the dialectical role often 
supercedes the "right" of 
the teacher to project his/ 
her own interpretations of 
the subject matter. There 
are traditional occasions 
when this condition of pos­
ing questions should be 
lifted to allow the teacher 
to interject his/her inter­
pretation. I did so with 
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(Discussion continues re­
garding Stephen Dedalus's 
physical sensations and 
feelings without any further 
insight into the reason 
Joyce is "using" these 
experiences to communi­
cate a symbolic message.) 
Interpretive Analysis 
the comment concerning the 
"ivory tower" and risked 
closing off Debbie's own 
interpretation of Stephen's 
reference to the school. 
I felt, however, that the 
metaphor of the "ivory tower" 
might open new doors of un­
derstanding for the students. 
I discovered in reflecting 
here that the students, some­
what like Stephen, were un­
certain about what it means 
and perhaps thinking in a 
very different frame. So, 
being responsive to their 
own dialogue with the text, 
I dropped the issue. The 
students appeared to want 
to continue interaction re­
lating to the feeling-sen­
sations experienced by 
Stephen and this discussion 
carried on for some time 
without any seemingly greater 
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Classroom Activities 
Later in the class . . . 
Teacher: What we find here 
are some strange terms that 
are used by the characters— 
such as "being in a wax" for 
what we might call "being-
in a jam." This is very 
much analogous to certain 
local expressions that we 
find in particular regions 
of the United States—sort 
of like the expressions 
typical to the different 
dialects in New England or 
even our own Apalachian area. 
What do you call the category 
of dialect that is particular 
Interpretive Analysis 
understanding of the 
author's symbolic intent. 
And rather than pushing 
their interest in under­
standing this symbolism, 
I chose to retreat for 
awhile and change the 
topic somewhat. 
This is yet another ap­
proach of pedagogy to 
move the discussion in a 
direction that the students 
may find more meaning in 
relation to their own ex­
perience. Discussing 
Joyce's use of language 
through the character of 
Stephen is a topic central 
to the traditional philo­
logical interests in her-
meneutics. Although this 
was not the instructional 
intent of the teacher, it 
does seem quite relevant 
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Classroom Dialogue 
to a specific region of the 
country? 
Lisa; Aren't they called 
colloquial expressions? 
Tommy: Yeh. Stephen was 
in Dublin where they talk 
different from the rest of 
Ireland—different loca­
tions. I couldn't under­
stand some of the things 
they talked about. 
Teacher: What do the rest 
of you think? Do you find 
Joyce's use of such "col­
loquial" terms confusing? 
John P.: You can usually 
pick up what they are . . . 
like what Miss Flynt calls 
idioms. You can usually 
figure out what they are 
by . . . uhm, just looking 
at them. 
Teacher: What are some 
examples that we could use 
here from our own experience? 
Interpretive Analysis 
in hindsight, or rather in 
my own historicity of un­
derstanding this dialogue. 
The students are not famil­
iar with the literary tech­
niques of language analysis 
and appropriately lean to­
wards the direction of re­
lating the topic here to 
their own understanding or 
experience in other con­
texts in the school., particu­
larly their English course-
work. Coincidentally, their 
on-going experience with the 
idiom and cliche as figures 
of speech is relevant to 
our rather open discussion 
of Joyce's text. This pro­
vides, I feel, a clear 
justification for such a 
tangential discussion as 
this. 
The flow, the give and take 
of the dialogue is often 
126 
Classroom Dialogue 
Can you think of any? 
John P. : Can ya'll think of 
any? (looks at others in his 
English class) . . . there 
are about 50 we learned. 
Debbie ; Tell us one. 
(laugh) 
John P.: "Today's Idiom": 
(reads from his notes) 
"Wear your heart on your 
sleeve." That is, "make 
your feelings noticed." 
And, "to wash dirty linen 
in public"—"to discuss 
openly private affairs." 
And, "to save face". . . 
well I don't think this 
is a good idiom . . . 
Teacher: Well, what is the 
definition of an idiom? 
John T.: I don't think 
that it is so important 
to know what it means as 
how to distinguish them 
from cliches. 
Teacher: Well, then, what 
Interpretive Analysis 
enhanced when there is a 
willingness to allow the 
subject of dialogues to 
"take its own course." Her-
meneutically speaking, that 
is an openness to emerging 
meaning and to the possi­
bility of new projections 
of understanding to become 
a part of the whole under­
standing under construction. 
Consequently, in the class­
room context, the hermeneu-
tic endeavor of searching 
freely and openly for new 
understandings affects the 
status of the formal cur­
riculum. The relationship 
of understanding determines 
the usefulness of the formal 
curriculum in contributing 
to the ongoing and future 
understanding of the teach-
er-student, student-student 
intersubjectivity. This is 
not a matter of placing a 
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Classroom Dialogue 
is a cliche? 
Charlene: Like, "bury the 
hatchet." 
Teacher; Is that a cliche? 
I am trying to understand 
the significance of idiom 
here for our discussion. 
. . . There obviously is 
a difference between slo­
gans, cliches and idioms— 
how can we distinguish 
them definitionally? 
Janis; Well, like, "clear 
as a bell" is a clich£. 
They are usually used more 
often. 
Tommy: In my opinion a 
cliche is a phrase describ­
ing an event, something 
happening. . . whereas 
an idiom is sorta like 
. . . it doesn't necessari­
ly have action to it . . . 
John T.: A clichi is like 
an adjective, it describes 
Interpretive Analysis 
higher value on the under­
standing shared solely for 
the meaning gained in human 
interaction. The possibili­
ties for encouraging and 
developing new paths toward 
a greater understanding of 
the formal, subject-matter 
curriculum should be evident. 
Certainly, there are "risks" 
taken through such a "sacri­
fice" for tangential dia­
logue. The dialogue concern­
ing the distinction between 
cliches and idioms has be­
come equally important to, 
and perhaps temporarily 
more important than, the 
discussion of the formal 
text. -
The tension acknowledged in 
attempting to differentiate 
between these two linguis­
tic variables, or figures 
of speech, is a good example 
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Classroom Dialogue 
something. 
Teacher; Then an idiom 
doesn't describe?. 
(pause) 
Lisa: I thought a cliche 
was something that was 
really current. 
Teacher: Do you mean com­
monly used? 
Kim; Yeh, it's kind of 
faddish. 
(pause) 
Teacher: Then how is an 
idiom used? 
John P.: Well, a cliche 
is more slang, more every­
day. An idiom is more 
established by tradition. 
Teacher: OK. Now you're 
beginning to clear-up the 
distinction—whether it is 
correct or not (looks some­
what curious and some stu­
dents laugh). But the 
point we need to make is 
Interpretive Analysis 
of the dialectical relation­
ship amongst the partici­
pants in dialogue that not 
only encourages the "game" 
of "passing the subject mat­
ter around" but ultimately 
assists in the construction 
of meaning relating the for­
mal curriculum with other 
parts of the curriculum 
seemingly tangential to the 
subject matter. And further­
more, the give-and-take dia­
lectic of questions and an­
swers amongst the participants 
is an obvious characteristic 
for a better, greater under­
standing of the intersubjec-
tivity of relationships in 
the classroom. 
The authority of the teacher 
is, I feel certainly justi­
fied here as a legitimate 
controlling variable neces­
sary for constructing this 
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Classroom Dialogue 
that the Irish, like our­
selves, use them too. May­
be even more than we do. 
(pause) Actually, I think 
the clich£ is not only more 
slang, but it refers to 
something not necessarily 
having anything to do with 
the words being used—such 
as "clear as a bell." The 
idiom is more in line with 
the region of use and the 
terms used in the idiom are 
much more metaphorically 
important to what the in­
tended meaning is—such as 
"wear your heart on your 
sleeve"—now let's try to 
relate this a bit more to 
Joyce's intentions. 
Chris: We got completely 
off the subject. 
Teacher; Not really. I 
mean it may help us in the 
long run . . . 
Interpretive Analysis 
matrix of relationships 
amongst all of the parts--
the formal curriculum, the 
participants in dialogue, 
and the myriad possibilities 
of tangential and emerging 
meanings provided by the 
dialogue relating to other 
subjects. 
The tension that is "pri-
mordially" apart of this 
hermeneutic circle of re­
lationships is, I believe, 
the significant means of 
mediation amongst the parts. 
And, in order to find a point 
of reference from which to 
begin reflecting upon this 
mediation that brings about 
the fusion of horizons of 
understanding, it is impor­
tant to acknowledge this 
legitimate authority of the 
teacher. 
In less traditional, less 
structured "learning 
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Classroom Dialogue Interpretive Analysis 
environments" or classrooms, 
the configuration of parts 
to whole is not necessarily 
any different when inter­
preted from the same inter­
est in human interaction 
or intersubjectivity. The 
same legitimate fear of 
"getting completely off the 
subject" is a shared prob­
lem inherent in any dialogue. 
There are a number of pedagogical insights that can be 
claimed as a consequence of applying hermeneutic analyses 
to such a "text" as this intersubjective encounter of teacher 
and students. An understanding that has hopefully been made 
explicit through the interpretive process is of the tension 
that exists between the formal, subject-matter curriculum and 
the curriculum of intersubjectivity. The dialectic of ques­
tion and answer often poses problems to the pedagogical in­
terests in structuring the teacher-student interaction solely 
around the formal text of the curriculum. The constant invi­
tation to carry on dialogue tangential to this formal text 
is quite evident. This tension between the "authority" of the 
subject matter and the openness in the intersubjective rela­
tionship demonstrates a universal characteristic of the 
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hermeneutic experience: the problem of achieving and main­
taining openness for genuine understanding. 
Although the authority of the teacher often reflects the 
power of control and provides periodic means for returning to 
the text of the formal curriculum, the occasions which appear 
to reflect greater understanding amongst the dialogical par­
ticipants are those in which more active yet tangential, 
intersubjectivity is evident. Openness to being absorbed 
in the subject matter ip a hermeneutic impulse that is depen­
dent upon the quality of intersubjectivity in the classroom. 
Whether the teaching tactic of periodic disengagement 
from maintaining a certain direction of study is judged as 
"unproductive" or overly open-ended is not important. The 
ought-ness of the pedagogical method is not a concern when 
the interest in understanding requires such openness. 
The possible conflict between the valued interest for 
choosing an orientation toward pedagogy and the requirements 
for encouraging understanding through pedagogy is an important 
problem that has emerged from this endeavor of hermeneutical 
analysis. Also, the question of the legitimacy of authority, 
which has been discussed earlier (in Chapter II) as an issue 
that distinguishes Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics from 
Habermas's critical theory, has re-emerged in the active re­
flection of this interpretive venture. Both of these con­
ditions—value and authority—reflect the "findings" or mean­
ing that I have come to in journeying with the perspective of 
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a hermeneutical inquiry concerning the intersubjective ex­
periences in schools. The conclusions that I can claim from 
this inquiry must include these issues of value and authority 
that have emerged from this application of the hermeneutical 
(ontological) lens. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Vandenberg (1974) has commented that "any analysis of 
any kind is without point unless the clarifying process dis­
criminates significant elements, extracting the 'ought' from 
the 'is' in the delineation of the phenomenon" (p. 195). This 
concern for the phenomenological relationship involves clari­
fication of the interpreter's normative interests. But, un­
like the methodical process of most analytical interpretations, 
the hermeneutic interests in phenomenological relationships 
concentrate primarily on the descriptive elements of what 
"is" in understanding itself that makes such relationships 
possible to begin with. However, those questions of "ought-
ness" are not without representation in the hermeneutical 
analysis. 
The acknowledgement that the (hermeneutic) interpretive 
approach uncovers (through its affirmation of the interpre­
ter's self-reflection) preconceptions and preunderstandings 
that condition the ongoing analysis, is also recognition of 
the values implicit to such an analysis. According to Gadamer 
(1975) , this recognition represents the "legitimacy" of not 
only the interpreter's understanding (of the tradition under 
study) but the interpreter's participation in coming to this 
understanding. Therefore, as both the interpreter in the 
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broad sense of having undertaken a search into the tradition 
of hermeneutical theory for a better understanding of inter-
subjectivity (in schools), and as the participant-teacher 
hermeneuticist (in the preceding case-study) demonstrating 
the everyday-ness of student-teacher intersubjectivity, I can 
now briefly project some meaningful conclusions concerning 
the value or intentionality inherent in my preunderstandings 
involving this research and some specific conclusions re­
garding the interpretive analysis chosen to represent the 
usefulness of the hermeneutical approach. In doing so, the 
questions of value and of authority will represent the under­
standing which has emerged through such a hermeneutical jour­
ney. 
Valuing and Understanding 
One significant preconception that I feel has been re­
flected in this study is the concern for the axiological 
question, "in whose interest" is research carried out? Macdonald 
has often posed this value question in the context of discuss­
ing issues regarding curriculum theory and practice. And, as 
a student of Macdonald, my preunderstandings of research 
have been conditioned by my sensitivity to such a concern. 
I am now in a position to consciously consider the relation­
ship between this study's representation of the understanding 
process and the value query, "in whose interest?", which has 
influenced the study. 
The hermeneutical circle of understanding affirms atten­
tion to the interpreter's prejudices and preconceptions. 
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However, the question now emerges as to which dimension of 
the interpretive process is most important to the study of 
intersubjective relationships, the values inherent in the 
interpreter's preconceptions of meaning or the understanding 
that reflects the fusion of horizons in intersubjectivity 
itself. Hermeneutical understanding, as the discovery of 
meaning, and awareness of the values that inform that under­
standing are similar when considered through the initial 
question, "in whose interest?". But understanding, unlike 
valuing, is only activated by the need to overcome some ques­
tion or problem in an existent preunderstanding. Thus, un­
derstanding also involves an interactive notion such that 
the exchange, mediation or sharing of pre-understandings with 
another person or text can occur. 
Valuing, on the other hand, though reflecting what has 
been acquired through interaction, is much less dependent on 
the need to overcome some tension in a relationship, even if 
it is the relationship between one's preunderstanding and 
emerging understanding. 
The problem of understanding requires a conceptualization 
of method or searching procedure quite unlike a method for 
attaining values or representing the individual's values. 
The value of understanding is itself dependent upon some 
awareness of how understanding is both needed and made possi­
ble. Furthermore, the problem of understanding itself tran­
scends the assumptions of valuing and requires a certain quality 
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of participation from those seeking to pursue it. Participa­
tion involves an active openness to mutuality in relationship 
and the potential for reciprocity and mediation in the search 
for understanding. The intersubjective necessity for under­
standing, then, requires some notion of the actual interaction 
and how to encourage those factors which help to bring about 
better understanding and realize emerging meanings. 
A New Projection of Meaning for the 
Hermeneutical-Dialectical Experience 
Because of this unfolding of my preconceptions of research, 
i.e., the relationship of the value query with the need to af­
firm the intersubjective prerequisites for understanding, I 
can better illustrate my initial response to Macdonald's (1979) 
model of "dual dialecticism" in describing the transcendent 
realm of the self's interaction with the environment. While 
also representing the dialectical relationship in reflective 
transactions and describing the domain of understanding as 
within the transaction itself, and not simply an exercise of 
the self's knowledge acquired from the relationship, I am now 
able to include those characteristics of openness, mediation 
and the fusion of horizons that better describe the hermeneuti-
cal dimension of intersubjective transactions. 
These perhaps more ontological or speculative characteris­
tics of the dialectical experience have also recently become 
an interest in Macdonald's (19 80) work concerning the her-
meneutical theory. 
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Macdonald has suggested that it is time to "reaffirm the 
legitimacy of contemplative curriculum theory" (1980 , p. 3). 
He has placed the contemplative or imaginative interests of 
the curricularist in the hermeneutical mode of searching for 
meaning, understanding and a "sense of unity and well being" 
that transcends the methodological practices of the "control 
and/or emancipation oriented theories" (p. 10). Macdonald 
has come to support the hermeneutic affirmation of an "onto-
logical platform" for legitimating the search for understand­
ing in educational theory and practice and for acknowledging 
the "meditative thinking" that occurs concomittantly with such 
a search for meaning (p. 11) . 
As I have also tried to define this search, or rather 
this disclosure of meaning, in its hermeneutic dimension, the 
horizon of Macdonald's conceptual portrayal of the interpre­
ter's "sense of unity" attracts my own horizon of understand­
ing regarding my participation with the subject of hermeneutics 
itself. As I reflect upon this participation, my horizon of 
understanding must be seen as having been initially informed 
by the preliminary projections of the study as a whole, in­
cluding such projections as the value interest or intentional-
ity in participation itself. With further penetration into 
the more detailed aspects of the study, this preliminary pro­
jection has been revised and alternative proposals (e.g., 
the interest in understanding qua understanding) have been 
considered. Thus, in a somewhat different frame than Macdonald's 
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interest in the hermeneutic "sense of unity," I am now sug-
testing that a "unity of sense" is also ultimately a reflec­
tion of the "ontological platform" of inquiry—that is, an 
interpretation of the whole in which our detailed knowledge 
of the parts can be integrated. 
We are all obviously both burdened and potentially lib­
erated by the many preconceptions and prejudgments that we 
carry along to provide us with projections of understanding 
and meaning. Until we are capable of reflecting upon and 
coming to a better self-understanding, we are incapable of 
such a unity of sense which is potentially emergent in each 
(hermeneutic) encounter. On the other hand, these self-re­
flective prerequisites which have been postulated by many who 
adhere to the more psychologistic analyses of the episte-
mological and consciously phenomenological domain of under­
standing, e.g., the critical theorists in sociology and the 
psychoanalysts, fail to include the element of mediation in 
intersubjectivity which must be acknowledged before an ade­
quate (genuine) understanding of either the self or the 
intersubjective relationship is possible. 
Authority and Participant-Hermeneutics 
One particular conditioning characteristic of the medi­
ation in intersubjectivity that I have come to experience as 
an emerging meaning in school relationships (by "applying" 
the hermeneutical analysis to my own participation in the 
case study cited) is the authoritarian role assumed by the 
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teacher in the classroom. The philosophical questioning of 
the legitimacy of this authority is necessary from the her-
meneuticist's perspective. 
The hermeneutical affirmation of the tradition-context 
that informs how we relate intersubjectively can be con­
sidered here as an affirmation of the teacher's role in ful­
filling the needs for instruction concerning the formal cur­
riculum. However, those characteristics of the teacher's 
authority which subvert the intersubjective relationship, 
(e.g., refusing to consider the questions of the students or 
denying the possibilities of emerging meaning in dialogue that 
is tangential to the subject-matter at hand), are also better 
understood as potentially illegitimate uses of authority. 
The question remains in considering the tradition of the 
teaching role as to whether this authority is necessary as 
a pedogogical aid for assuring the traditional student-
teacher relationship. 
Although the hermeneuticist does not assume that this 
tradition is necessarily manipulative, the requirements of 
objectivity inherent in the way the teaching tradition has 
conditioned the institutionalization of teacher-student inter-
subjectivity can be criticized as impeding the ongoing need 
for encouraging intersubjectivity as a mediation for greater 
meaning and understanding. 
The interest in self-reflection shared by critical theory 
and philosophical hermeneutics takes a very different path 
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when confronting this issue of authority. As was clarified 
in the discussion relating the Habermas-Gadamer debate (in 
Chapter III), authority to the critical tradition is the con­
trolling element that makes self-reflection necessary for 
greater understanding of the self's condition and relation­
ship to authority. 
A critical analysis of the case-study dialogue (in Chap­
ter V) would undoubtedly point out those characteristics in 
the relationships amongst the students, teacher, formal 
curriculum and the school which illustrate the manipulation 
of one or more of these by the controlling interest of one 
or more of the others. Although I do not believe that such 
an analysis would uncover any particularly "subversive" 
agenda on the part of the "participants" in the case study 
that has been used, the degree of interest of the critical 
analyst in pointing out the implicit controls, e.g., in my 
own recognition of the teacher's authority in directing the 
class discussion, would determine whether or not the need 
for emancipatory self-reflection was evident. 
Hermeneutics and the Creation of Meaning 
As I stated earlier (and in Chapter III) the epistemologo-
cal orientation of the critical analyst would encourage con­
centration on the effect of these controlling factors on how 
the relationships are known phenomenologically and not neces­
sarily on how we can better understand the more fundamental 
nature of how the relationships themseleves create meaning. 
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fiven Gadamer (1975) has criticized the tradition of re­
lationships in formal education. He has claimed that: 
. . . to understand the other person in advance per­
forms the function of keeping the claim of the other 
person at a distance. We are familiar with this 
from the educative relationship, an authoritative 
form of welfare work. (p. 323) 
I have not only experienced this "distancing" of others 
as a teacher, but also in the experience of attempting to re­
late the role of participant-hermeneuticist with the role of 
the teacher. It remains questionable to me whether the teach­
er in the traditional role can participate and also actively 
consider those conditions which are important to encouraging 
intersubjectivity in the classroom that creates meaning and 
understanding. 
The most important clarification of hermeneutical theory 
which assuages this dilemma is the difference between the 
epistemological interests and the ontological interest which 
includes a speculative willingness to an imaginative journey­
ing in a tradition of experience toward greater awareness or 
understanding of the meaning of "being" itself, e.g., being-
in-the-curriculum. 
Jerome Bruner (1970) has discussed the metaphoric com­
binations in our cognitive experience that, I think, are help­
ful in connecting the common interests of the critical theorist 
and philosophical hermeneuticist. In addition, Bruner is 
helpful in relating the importance of intersubjectivity to 
this common search for understanding. He refers to the pos­
sibilities of "human connection," what I interpret as creative 
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meaning, as if self-reflection is the key to unlocking the 
doors of those things that limit our understanding. Like the 
artist, one "must be close enough to these conditions in him­
self so that they may guide his choice among combinations" 
(p. 22) . Bruner refers to this choice as the "production 
of novelty," "a placing of things in new perspective" (p. 19). 
However, the creative means that Bruner discusses is not only 
a matter of a reflective critique of those controlling con­
ditions. It is necessarily a matter of "looking sidewise 
rather than directly" (p. 12) and requires more imagination 
and connective activity than the critical theorist's rational­
ity allows. 
The hermeneuticist is more like the artist and relies 
more on hunches and what Bruner calls "effective surprise" 
in order to support the search for meaning. The artist's 
"medium," the loosely woven web of ideas relating the self 
with other selves and the phenomenal world, is very much 
the hermeneutic realm of intersubjectivity. 
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